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AMENDMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
AFTER LIMITATION PERIODS
GARRY D. WATSON*
Toronto
It may be asserted without fear of contradiction that it is not possible
in the year 1887 for an honest litigant in Her Majesty's Supreme Court
to be defeated by any mere technicality, any slip, any mistaken step in
his litigation .t
I. Introduction .
All of the Canadian common law provinces have rules of practice
giving the courts broad powers to amend proceedings .' Generally,
the courts have honoured the sweeping directive of the rules that
"all necessary amendments shall be made . . . to secure the
advancement of justice, the determining of the real matter in
dispute, and the giving of judgment according to the very right
and justice of the case" .'2 And in such a way as to justify the
optimistic pronouncement of Lord Justice Bowen quoted above.
The rules of court themselves place no limits on the power of
amendment and few have been added by judicial decision . The
benevolent principle, established early and acted upon consistently,
is that "however negligent or careless may have been the . . .
omission, and however late the proposed amendment, the amend-
ment should be allowed" unless some injustice which cannot be
compensated in costs would be done to the opponent. 3 For the
Garry D. Watson, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Downsview, Ont .
t Bowen L.J . .addressing American lawyers in 1887, quoted in Vanderbilt,
Improving the Administration of Justice-Two Decades of Development
(1957), p . 88 .
1 Alberta, Supreme Court Rules 1969, rs 38, 132, 558-561 ; British
Columbia, Supreme Court Rules 1961, Os 16 and 28 ; Manitoba, Queen's
Bench Rules 1968, rs 51(2) and 156 ; New Brunswick, Rules of the Supreme
Court 1956, Os 16 and 28 ; Newfoundland, Rules of the Supreme Court 1919,
0.27; Nova Scotia, Civil Procedure Rules 1972, r . 15 ; Ontario, Rules of
Practice, rs 132, 136 and 185 ; Prince Edward Island, Rules of the Supreme
Court 1954, Os 16 and 28 ; Saskatchewan, Queen's Bench Rules 1961, rs 48
and 210 . This article is directed only to the procedure of the common law
provinces .
2 Ont. Rules of Practice, r. 185 . The analogous rules in the other prov-
inces, have similar though not identical wording.
3 Per Brett M.R . in Clarapede v. Commercial Union Ass'n (1884), 38
W.R . 262, at p . 263 and restated by him in Steward v . N. Metropolitan
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most part the application of this principle has rid procedure of the
pitfalls that faced litigants under the common law pleading
system ; the "advancement of justice" has been secured so that,
generally, cases today are decided on the merits rather than on
procedural niceties .
However, one dark and often bleak corner exists in the law
of amendment : the courts' restrictive attitude to amendments after
the expiration of the statute of limitations . Though in general`s the
rules are silent on this matter the courts have seen fit to carry
over to modern procedure the position that existed under common
law pleading .", This continuity, somewhat of a paradox in an age
of reform, was achieved in Weldon v. Neal ." There, Lord Esher
refused a plaintiff leave to amend to add to her slander action,
after the expiry of the limitation period, claims for assault and
false imprisonment. In so doing he set forth in a much quoted
passage what has generally come to be considered an immutable
principle of modern practice :
Tramways Co. (1886), 16 Q.B.D . 556 (C.A .) . This statement has been
frequently adopted in Canadian courts, e.g ., Slattery v . Ottawa Elec . Rltivy
Co ., [1946] O.W.N . 437 (H.C .) ; Miller v . C.P.R ., [1933] 1 W.W.R . 233
(Alta App. Div.) . On the subject of the exercise of the amendment power
see generally, Holmested and Gale, Ontario Judicature Act and Rules of
Practice (1969), r. 185 ; Williston and Rolls, The Law of Civil Procedure
(1970), Vol . 1, pp . 732-739 .
4 As will be noted infra, Part IV, a few Canadian jurisdictions have
enacted special rules or statutory provisions to deal with certain aspects of
this problem.
r, The rule, that no amendment would be allowed which set up a new
cause of action after the expiry of the limitation period, clearly formed
part of the common law pleading system, see, Cross v . Kaye (1796), 6
Dornf. & East 543 (K.B .) ; Peter v. Craft (1804), 4 East 433 (K.B.) ; Mad-
dock v . Hammett (1796), 7 Term Rep. 55, 101 E.R . 851 (K.B .) ; Roberts v.
Bate (1837), 6 A. & E. 778 (Q.B .) ; Goodchild v. Leadlant (1848), 1 Exch .
707 . The suggestion in Millar, Civil Procedure in the Trial Court in
Historical Perspective (1952), p. 185, that the rule was unknown to the
common law, or in modern England, is incorrect. But at common law
"cause of action" was given a much broader meaning than it later received .
Little distinction seems to have been made between "cause of action" and
"form of action" . The courts appear to have acted on the principle that
no change in the cause of action occurred unless the form of action was
changed. This would explain the cases decided at common law permitting
amendments after the statutory period which, under some modern inter-
pretations of the concept, appear to allow a change in the "cause of
action". See e.g ., Bearcroft v. Hundred of Burnham (1695), 3 Lev. 347,
83 E.R . 723 (C.P .) ; Exec . of Duke of Marlborough v . Widmore (1731), 2
Str. 890 (K.B .) ; Maddock v . Hammett, supra ; Lakin v . Watson (1834),
2 C . & M. 685, 149 E.R . 936 (Ex .) ; Christie v . Bull (1847), 16 M. & W.
669, 153 E.R. 1385 (Ex . Ch.) ; Cocks v . Malins (1851), 6 Exch. 803 .
6 (1887), 19 Q.B.D . 394, 56 L.J.Q .B . 621 (C.A .) .
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We must act on the settled rule of practice, which is that amendments
are not admissible when they prejudice the rights of the opposite party
as existing at the date of such amendments . If an amendment were
allowed setting up a cause of action, which, if the writ were issued in
respect thereof at the date of the amendment, would be barred by the
Statute of Limitations, it would be allowing the plaintiff to take
advantage of her former writ to defeat the statute and taking away an
existing right from the defendant; a proceeding which, as a general
rule, would be, in my opinion, improper and unjust . Under very
peculiar circumstances the Court might perhaps have power to allow
such an amendment, but certainly as a general rule it will not do so?
Until very recently," in subsequent cases no recognition has
been accorded to the exception provided for in the last sentence
of Lord Esher's statement. Generally it has been assumed that
whenever the amendment sought would change the cause of action
after the expiration of the limitation period, there automatically
results an injustice to the defendant which cannot be compensated
for in costs. That such injustice may result in the "core" cases
(for instance, where the plaintiff -attempts to use the timely com-
mencement of a contract action as a vehicle for the subsequent
addition of an unrelated claim for assault or negligence which is
then statute barred) can easily be appreciated.9 But any injustice
is usually much less apparent in cases constituting the "penumbra"
of the principle. And unfortunately, though not unexpectedly, the
majority of the reported cases fall into this category. In the
penumbra cases the picture is typically one of an "honest plaintiff"
who, having made a slip or taken a mistaken step in the litigation,
then seeks to remedy the defect through an amendment. The
requested amendment is often one of form only or does not
drastically change the plaintiff's claim, and would in no way
prejudice the defendant, in fact, in conducting the defence on the
merits . In these circumstances the injustice to the defendant is
difficult to appreciate . To most reasonable men to refuse the
plaintiff's amendment in such a case, on the basis that it is an
7 Ibid., at p. 395 (Q.B.D .) .
s See Basarsky v. Quinlan, [1972] S.C.R . 380, 24 D.L.R . (3d) 720,
[1972] 1 W.W.R . 303. Also in two earlier cases, Clark v. Thomas Gaytee
Studios Inca, [1930] 3 W.W.R . 489, 25 Sask . L. R. 108 (C.A .) and
Kirkpatrick v. Slasor, [1971] 5 W.W.R . 737 (B.C .S.C.), the exception was
referred to in permitting amendment.
9 In terms of the approach advocated here it is not clear whether
Weldon v. Neal itself was correctly decided. To answer that question more
would need to be known about the facts of the case, e.g ., did the plaintiff
rely on the same occurrence as giving rise to the original and amended
claims? What prior and actual knowledge did the defendant have regarding
the claims being made by the plaintiff? Could the defendant show any
prejudice (apart from the loss of the limitation defence) in having to now
meet these new claims?
240
	
LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [VOL . LIII
attempt to set up a claim now barred by statute is, in the words
of Lord Justice Bowen, "to allow an honest litigant to be defeated
by a mere technicality".
My major purpose here will be to examine critically the
supposedly well-established rule that a plaintiff may not amend to
change his cause of action after the expiration of the limitation
period, and to challenge the assumption that to allow such an
amendment will always be unjust to the defendant. As a first step,
in Part II below, the manner in which Canadian courts have
handled the rule will be documented . Defendants have sought to
make the rule operative in various contexts . In this respect a
familiar pattern is repeated . When a technical rule is made
available to litigants, (or rather, to their lawyers) much creativity
and ingenuity are unleashed in an attempt to broaden the applica-
tion of the rule. Frequently, Canadian courts, influenced by their
English counterparts,"' have applied the rule not only strictly but
in a range of contexts far beyond that faced by the English Court
of Appeal in Weldon v . Neal, the modern genesis of the rule . But
the cases, while never expressly rejecting the rule, reveal an
increasing judicial reluctance to allow it to operate to deny a
plaintiff a trial on the merits . In Part III, the rule and its purpose
are analysed in an attempt to justify this judicial reticence and to
suggest how the courts might handle the problem in a more
satisfactory manner. Finally, in Part IV, a model rule of practice
is proposed to deal comprehensively with the problem.
It should be stressed that this problem of the post-limitation
amendment of proceedings is not an esoteric one, nor one that is
merely of academic interest . The volume of decisions on the point
is itself enough to dispel any such belief. If one looks only at the
case law for the past ten years, it will be seen that there have been
at least six decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada involving
the issue, a further twenty-seven reported decisions on the Court
of Appeal level and something in excess of seventy-five decisions
in courts of first instance . Just how and why the problem should
10 Owing to the sheer volume of Canadian cases, no attempt will be
made here to analyse or catalogue the English cases on the subject.
However, it should be pointed out that Canadian courts have frequently
referred to them . The English cases, prior to the new English rule on the
subject (see infra, Part IV), are collected in The Annual Practice (1966),
p. 461 . For the subsequent case law see The Supreme Court Practice (1973),
p. 20/5 . In approach and outcome the English cases are generally con-
sistent with the Canadian cases . There is also a considerable body of
Australian case law, see Williams, Practice of the Supreme Court of Victoria
(2nd ed ., 1973), 0.16, rs 2 and 11, 0.28, r . 1 and a vast quantity of United
States cases see Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 6
(1971), pp . 482-536.
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arise so often will be discussed in more detail in Fart III. At this
juncture it is sufficient to observe that the major factor is the
existence of numerous short limitation periods, particularly those
applicable to actions, arising out of motor-vehicle accidents, which
often expire before the plaintiff has fully formulated his case.
Moreover, it is not just the volume of cases that is important : the
nature of these cases needs to be appreciated. Whereas most
procedural decisions fall short of being dispositive of all or part
of an -action, the situation is usually otherwise with cases involving
a request for a post-limitation amendment. Success to the.
defendant in opposing leave to amend can often lead to victory
for him on the whole or a significant part of the plaintiff's case,
without having to defend on the merits . This aspect seems to be
well understood by parties, particularly defendants, for when the
issue arises it is hard-fought, often to the appellate level.
In examining the Canadian cases, attention will be given not
only to the decisions and their reasoning but also to the method-
ological approach of the courts . Although the matter of approach
is discussed at some length in Fart III, a few comments by way of
definition and introduction will be helpful at this point. Two quite
different approaches to the basic problem are possible, and can be
identified in the cases. The dominant approach is here referred
to as an "analytical" (or "conceptual") one, and the other as a
"functional" approach . The analytical approach is characterized
by a concern with the inquiry "does the amendment sought set up
a new cause of action?", this question being asked in a context
which assumes (a) that all claims -and amendments can be
abstractly classified into distinct categories of causes of action,
and (b) that such a question is a pertinent inquiry, or the only
pertinent inquiry. This approach eschews any consideration of
whether the proffered amendment will actually prejudice the
defendant in defending on the merits . It assumes that if a new
cause of action is alleged by the amendment the defendant will
be prejudiced, on ,the theory that he will be thus deprived of
accrued rights under the now expired statute of limitations . By
contrast the functional approach has as its central concern the
question whether the defendant will be prejudiced in fact by the'
amendment in defending the action at trial. When this approach
is adopted the pertinent question is not whether the amendment
raises a new cause of action. The significant issue is, did the
defendant receive such notice of the plaintiff's case against him
that he will suffer no actual prejudice in having to meet the
amended claim? The analytical approach undoubtedly, predom-
inates in the older cases. However, today this approach is
frequently tempered by, or abandoned in favour of, a functional
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analysis . This development in the modern cases is important, not
only in itself, but also because it greatly weakens the contemporary
precedential value of much of the older case law .
II . The Canadian Case Law.
To facilitate discussion of the case law the reported decisions
are grouped around several varied applications of the doctrine .
The major dichotomy is between cases involving a change of
parties and those in which, while no change of parties is attempted,
the defendant argues that the plaintiff is attempting to change
his cause of action to add a new, statute barred, claim .
A. Amendments Changing the Plaintiff's Cause of Action .
(i) Amendments to the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim Objected
to as Involving the Addition of a New, Statute-barred Claim.
These are cases in which the issue raised is most closely
analogous to that faced by the court in Weldon v . Neal . Here the
defendant relies on the rule in its original and purest form . The
plaintiff seeks to amend an already sufficient statement of claim"
by adding or substituting another claim . In opposing the amend-
ment, the defendant raises the objection that this involves the
setting up of a new cause of action, and, since it is sought after
the statute of limitations has expired, it must be refused in
deference to his accrued rights under the statute .
If the new claim which the plaintiff seeks to allege is known
by a different name to the one he originally pleaded (that is it
involves what was, historically, another form of action) or it
relies upon a different statutory provision to the original claim,
the defendant's objection to the amendment has generally been
upheld. Hence, amendments have been refused which sought
to add a claim for negligence to one for nuisance,l2 claims for
fraud and assault to one for malpractice by negligence, 13 a claim
for malicious prosecution to claims for false arrest, assault and
11 In the sense that it does not omit essential allegations, but states
a valid claim and would not be subject to a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action . Cases in which the plaintiff seeks to amend a
statement of claim which fails to state a cause of action are discussed,
infra, section A (ii) .
11 Pitt v . Bank of Nova Scotia, [1956] O.W.N. 872 (Master) .
13 Ellis v. Pelton, [1933] O.W.N. 191 (C.A .) ; Burk v . S ., B ., & K.,
[1952] 1 D.L.R . 317, 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 520 (B .C .S .C .) (Medical malprac-
tice action : amendment to add claim for assault to negligence claim,
refused) .
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false imprisonment,"4 or a claim in contract to one for negligence .15
Similarly, amendments seeking to add claims under the Liquor
Control Act"` or the Trustee Act17 to claims under the Fatal
Accidents Act, or to change the basis of recovery to a different
statutory provision,"' or to allege a contract with persons other
than those with whom contractual relations were originally
alleged,"' have been refused. An analytical approach dominates
these cases. Often the reasoning of the judgments is sparse, it
being generally taken as axiomatic that a new cause of action
is alleged whenever the new claim has a different legal name
or relies on a different statute . However, the recent decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Basarsky v. Quinlan20
represents a radical departure in approach by a court to this type
'of problem situation. In that case the plaintiff administrator had
timely commenced an action under the Trustee Act claiming
that the defendant's negligent driving had caused the deceased's
death. After the expiration of the limitation period the plaintiff
applied to add a claim for $150,000.00 under the Fatal Accidents
Act on behalf of the widow and children of the deceased . In
objecting to the amendment the defendant, who had been success-
ful in both courts below, relied on Weldon v . Neal and "the
jurisprudence emanating therefrom" . The amendment, they
claimed, attempted to set up a new and statute barred claim.
Mr. Justice Hall, writing the reasons of the court, seized upon
the much neglected caveat of Lord Esher in Weldon v. Neal that
the court "would, under very peculiar circumstances"2" allow
14 Mockler v . Town of Grand Falls (1953), 32 N.B.R . 51 (N.B .S.C.) .
15 City Construction Co. Ltd . v. Salmon's Transfer Ltd., [19731 5 W.W.R .
378 (B.C.C.A .) .
is McEvoy v . Taylor, [1940] O.W.N . 106 (H.C.) (Amendment to add
a claim for wrongful death under the Liquor Control Act to a claim under
the Fatal Accidents Act, refused) .
17 Schubert v . Sterling Trusts Corp ., [1938] O.W.N . 133 (Master)
(Amendment to add a claim under the Trustee Act to a claim under the
Fatal Accidents Act, refused) . But now compare Basarsky v. Quinlan,
scrlira, footnote 8 .
1sKiselewsky v. Compton and Maybee (1970), 73 W.W.R . 377, 13
D.L.R . (3d) 624 (B.C.C.A.) (Motor vehicle case . Amendment introducing
a new theory as to the cause of the accident and which would have made
the defendant owner liable under a different statutory provision, refused
on the ground that in the circumstances the amendment would actually
prejudice the defendant) ; cf . Weston v. Copplestone, [1974] 5 O.R. (2d)
724 (H.C.) .
is Davidson v . Campbell (1888), 5 Man . L.R. 251 (Q.B .) .
2o Supra, footnote 8 .
21 Hall J . pointed out that in the report of Weldon v . Neal in 56 L.J.Q.B .
621 the term "would" is used, whereas in the report in 19 Q.B.D . 394,
see text supra, at footnote 7, the phrase used is "might perhaps" .
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an amendment despite the expiry of the limitation period . Equating
"peculiar" to "special" in modern usage, Hall J . found in the
case before him special circumstances warranting the amendment :
all the facts relating to the defendant's liability for the death
had been pleaded in the original statement of claim ; the defendant
had admitted liability for the death ; and on the examination for
discovery of the plaintiff, prior to the passage of the limitation
period, the defendant's counsel had asked a variety of questions on
matters relevant only to a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act.
Consequently, it could not be suggested that the defendants were
"actually prejudiced" by the plaintiff's failure to specifically name
the Fatal Accidents Act in the original statement of claim and, in
light of the special circumstances existing in the case, the court
held that the amendment should be permitted .'==
Less uniform in outcome are those cases where the amend-
ment, while altering the grounds upon which the plaintiff seeks
relief, falls short of a change in his "form of action", for instance,
where his claim remains one for negligence but different acts are
relied on as constituting the negligence . That a lack of uniformity,
and possibly some change in approach, should occur in such
cases is understandable . Here a need to strike a balance becomes
apparent . It is self-evident in these cases that the plaintiff is
making a material change in his case ; he would have no need
to seek an amendment if the matter was already covered by the
allegations of his existing statement of claim . On the other hand,
since the prohibition is only upon amendments changing the
cause of action it is implicit in the rule, and often expressly
recognized by the courts*-'-*' that the plaintiff retains some power
of amendment despite the expiration of the limitation period .
In these circumstances analytical classification is more difficult
than in cases involving a clear change of legal theory and the
application of this approach has not always produced consistent
decisions . On occasions, functional considerations have been
resorted to when the inconclusiveness of analytical classification
is appreciated.
In these cases the plaintiff has often been allowed to amend
but differences of judicial opinion have occurred on several points .
For instance, where the amended claim remained one for
== Contrast, Kiselewsky, supra, footnote 18, where an amendment relying
on a different statutory provision was refused in circumstances where the
court felt the defendant would be actually prejudiced by the amendment.
sa E.g., Western Canadian Greyhound Lines v. Poinerleau, [1955] 4
D.L.R . 133, 15 W.W.R . 182 (Alta App. Div.) ; Smith v. B.C. Etec . Rlwy,
[1937] 1 W.W.R . 718 (B.C .S.C.) and also Pontin v. Wood, [1962] 1 All
E.R . 294 (C.A .) .
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negligence, the outcome has varied .='} Similarly, cases in which
an amendement has been sought to claim a different or an addi-
tional kind of damage, while retaining the same legal theory,
have produced conflicting decisions.° One such conflict, as to
whether the addition of a claim for personal injuries to a claim
for property damage arising out of a motor vehicle collision
amounts to the addition of a new cause of action, has now
been resolved by a Supreme Court of Canada decision holding
that it does not. 226 Cases involving amendments to increase the
damages claimed have been consistent, all permitting the amend-
ment .2'
Despite the difficulty in resolving these cases (that is where
the amendment sought falls short of a complete change in the
plaintiff's theory or recovery) by a process of abstract analytical
classification, many of the older cases adopted this approach .
Frequently, the opinions amounted to little more than an
assertion that a new cause of action was (or was not) alleged,
24 Cf . Barker v . B.C . Elec . Rlwy (1934), 48 B.C.R . 427 (S.C .) (Amend-
ment adding allegation of failure to keep streetcar tracks in repair, to
original allegation of negligent operation of streetcar, refused) ; Le Fort v .
B .C . Elec . Rlwy Co. (1955), 16 W.W.R . 292 (B.C.S.C .) (Amendment
adding allegation of defective bell system on bus, to original allegation of
negligent driving, refused) ; and the cases discussed infra, footnote 140,
with, Fogg v . Town of Kenora, [1940] O.R. 421 (C.A .) (Amendment
adding allegation of negligence in permitting an excessive slope on sidewalk,
to original allegation of failure to remove ice, allowed) ; Mansfield v .
Patterson (1955), 18 W.W.R. 38 (B.C.S.C .) (Amendment adding allegation
of gross negligence to original allegation of negligent driving, allowed) ;
Can. Motor Sales Corp. Ltd . v. The "Madonna", 24 D.L.R. (3d) 573, [1972]
F.C . 25 (Claim for damage to goods carried : writ endorsement referred to
a specific voyage and to bills of lading of a particular date . Amendment
alleging later voyage, and different bills of lading, allowed) ; Weston v.
Copplestone, supra, footnote 18 .
25 Cf. City of Vancouver v . Dubois (1954), 13 W.W.R . (N.S .) 42
(B.C.S.C.) (Motor vehicle case . Amendment to add claim for loss of
services of plaintiff's servants, to original claim for destruction of plaintiff's
vehicle, refused) ; with, Poste v. Gregoire, [1964] 1 O.R . 155 (Master)
(Motor vehicle case. Amendment to add claim for cargo damage to claim
for damages to vehicle, permitted) ; and Stockton v . Webb (No. 2), [1934]
2 W.W.R . 564 (Man . C.A.) (Addition of claim for special damages to
original claim for general damages, permitted) . See also the cases in the
next footnote.
2s Cahoon v . Franks, [1967] S.C.R . 455, 63 D.L.R. (2d) 274, 60 W.W.R.
684 ; subsequently applied in Thorne v. McGregor, [1973] 3 O.R . 54, 35
D.L.R . (3d) 687 (H.C.) and Armour v. Stackhouse, [1973] O.R . 432
(H.C.) . See also Carter v . Dodd, [1961] O.W.N . 306 ; Roe v . F . A . Buskard
& Son Ltd ., [1952] O.W.N . 206 (Master) .
27 Ozipko v . Massey-Ferguson Ltd . (1965), 53 W.W.R. 439 (Alta App.
Div.) ; Stockton v . Webb (No . 2), supra, footnote 25 ; White v . Proctor,
[1936] O.W.N . 268 (H.C.) .
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without any explanation as to why this was so .2s However, in
more recent cases a functional approach to the problem has been
evident .29 One general doctrine has been developed in the area
under discussion which gives to the plaintiff a broad privilege
of amendment. Even where the amendment sets up a cause of
action different to that alleged in the original statement of claim,
it has usually been allowed if the court finds that it is within the
"umbrella of the writ","" that is, if it comes within the general
endorsement on the writ . The basis of this doctrine is that it is the
issuing of the writ which stops the running of the statute of
limitations and it does so with respect to all claims covered
by the endorsement of the writ . Consequently, any amendment
that is within the endorsement of the writ is not statute barred
and is permitted . This approach has been used in cases from
various provinces" though far more frequently in British Columbia
2s See, e.g ., Mansfield v. Patterson, supra footnote 24 ; Le Fort v. B.C .
Elec . Rlwy, supra, footnote 24 ; City of Vancouver v. Dubois, supra, foot-
note 25 .
2s See, e.g ., Western Canadian Greyhound Lines v. Pomerleau, supra,
footnote 23 (Amendment to correct an initial mix-up as to which of two
defendants was owner and who was the driver, permitted on the ground
that defendants were in no way prejudiced because they at all times knew
the facts and must have recognized the mistake as soon as they received
the statement of claim) ; Thorne v. McGregor, supra, footnote 26 (In per-
mitting the addition of a claim for property damage to a personal injury
action, Addy J. referred to the fact that the defendant had sufficient notice
not to be prejudiced in having to meet the new claim) ; Can . Motor Sales
Corp . Ltd. v. The "Madonna", see supra, footnote 24 (Amendment to
allege a different voyage permitted because, through correspondence, the
defendant knew all along that the plaintiff was really claiming in respect
of this voyage) ; Slattery v. Ottawa Elec . Rlwy Co ., [1946] O.W.N . 437
(H.C .) (Functional approach used in refusing amendment) .
"" The phrase appears to be that of Morris L.J . in Graff Bros. Estates
Ltd. v. Rimrose Brook Joint Sewage Board, [1953] 2 Q.B . 318, [1953] 3
W.L.R . 419, at p. 426, [1953] 2 All E.R . 631, at p. 636, and quoted in
White v. Vancouver Gen. Hospital (1963), 45 W.W.R . 34 (B.C.S.C.) .
31 The doctrine has been applied in the following cases : Royal Bank v.
Mullett, [1923] 3 W.W.R . 17 (Alto S.C.) (Action against the endorser of
a promissory note ; amendment to allege that notice of dishonour had been
given the defendant, allowed) ; Smith v. B.C . Elec . Rlwy Co . & Martin,
supra, footnote 23 (Original allegation was negligent operation of a street-
car by M: amendment to allege negligent operation of a different streetcar
by another employee, allowed) ; Dowling v. Rud (1959), 1"1 D.L.R . (2d)
527, 36 W.W.R . 471 (B .C.C.A .) (Change from statutory liability to
common law vicarious liability, allowed) ; White v. Vancouver Gen .
Hospital, ibid . (Amendment adding different acts of negligence to those
originally alleged, allowed) ; Jones v. Vancouver (1956), 17 W.W.R . 494
(B.C.S.C .) (Action against municipality ; addition of claim of nonfeasance
to one based on misfeasance, allowed) ; Mercer v. B.C . Elec . Rltivy Co .
(1912), 3 W.W.R . 190 (B.C.C.A .) ; Long and City of Toronto v. Mines,
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than elsewhere." The doctrine was actually rejected in an early
Ontario decision33 but has since been applied in later cases in
that province.34 It is interesting to observe that this approach has
both functional and analytical aspects. From an analytical stand-
point, the amendment is permissible because it is the writ which
preserves the plaintiff's claim from the bar of the limitations
statute and all claims are preserved which are covered by or set
out in the endorsement (:there being no longer any general re-
striction upon asserting more than one cause of action in a law
suit) . In functional terms, any amendment within the umbrella
of the writ is permissible because it is one of which the defendant
was duly notified before the expiration of the limitation period .
These functional considerations have been emphasized in many
of the cases.35 Indeed, in several recent decisions courts, showing
concern for such functional consideration, have broadened the
application of the doctrine by recognizing a permissible area of
amendment beyond the strict limits of the endorsement of the
writ.3s
Reliance of the Weldon v. Neal rule has not been exclusively
the preserve of defendants . On occasion it has been involved by
[1948] O.W.N . 328 (Master) ; Roe v. F. A . Buskard & Son Ltd., supra,
footnote 26 ; MacKenzie v . Schluter (1967), 65 D.L.R . (2d) 540, 62
W.W.R . 291 (B.C.C.A .) .
3=See the cases in preceding footnote . The reported cases in which the
doctrine has been invoked came from British Columbia, Ontario and
Alberta. The paucity of cases from the Prairie provinces is explicable since
those provinces have abolished the use of the generally endorsed writ, see
discussion infra, text at footnotes 38-40 . But see, Mitchell v. Campbell,
[1957] 2 W.W.R. 497, [1937] 3 D.L.R. 542 (C.A.) for an analogous argu-
mént treating a defective statement of claim as a writ of summons .
33 Schubert v . Sterling Trusts Corp ., supra, footnote 17 . -
34 Long and City of Toronto v . Mines, supra, footnote 31 ; Roe v . F . A .
Buskard & Son Ltd., supra, footnote 26 (Motor vehicle case : amendment
to add a claim for personal injuries to a claim for damage to plaintiff's
car, allowed) .
3", See, e.g., Roe v. F . A . Buskard and Son Ltd., ibid. ; Smith v . B.C . Elec.
Rlwy Co . & Martin, supra, footnote 23 .
36 MacKenzie v. Schluter, supra, footnote 3, (Writ claimed damages suf-
fered as a result of "the negligent driving of S" : in fact the car had been
driven by H, with the consent of S who was the owner . A statement of claim
so alleging held to be a permissible "extension of the endorsement of the
writ", because defendant knew all along he was really being sued as owner
and was not prejudiced) ; accord : Hywron v . McIlroy, [197312 W.W.R. 169
(Man . C.C .) ; but cf . Kiselewky v. Compton and Maybee, supra, footnote 18,
and City Construction Co . Ltd . Salmon's Transfer Ltd ., supra, footnote 15 .
See also Can . Motor Sales Corp . Ltd. v . The "Madonna", supra, footnote 24
(Amendment changing bills of lading sued on, permitted because, through
correspondence, defendant knew all along on which bills of lading the
plaintiff was suing) .
248
	
LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [VOL . LIII
plaintiffs, sometimes with success, in an attempt to prevent
defendants from amending their counterclaims.- -,
(ii) Amendments Sought to Validate a Defective Statement of
Claim or a Defective Writ Endorsement.
These cases differ slightly from the types of cases discussed in
the preceeding section. Here the plaintiff's initial pleading or writ
is defective in some way so that it fails, technically, to state any
cause of action against the defendant . If the limitation period has
expired when the plaintiff applies for leave to amend to cure the
defect, defendants have argued that the Weldon v. Neal principle
prohibits the amendment. In the past, grave injustices were done to
plaintiffs where courts have accepted the defendants' argument .
37 The common law rule as to the application of limitation provisions to
counterclaims is that a defendant cannot assert a cause of action by counter-
claim if it is statute barred at the time he delivers his counterclaim : Lowe v.
Bentley (1928), 44 T.L.R . 388 (K.B .) ; Wiltshire v . McLeod, [1932] O.W.N .
21 (H.C.) . This rule, since it frequently prevents a defendant from counter-
claiming at all in motor-vehicle cases (which are typically governed by short
limitation periods) has been altered in most Canadian jurisdictions by legis-
lation, similar to the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O ., 1970, c.202,
s.146(3), providing that if the plaintiff's action is brought within the twelve
months limitation period and the defendant counterclaims "in respect of
damages occasioned in the same accident, the lapse of time herein limited
(i .e . 12 months) is not a bar to the counterclaim . . ." . Under this legislation
where the defendant has omitted to include a counterclaim in his initial
pleading and has requested leave to amend to add one, plaintiffs have argued
that the legislation does not permit such an amendment after the expiration
of the limitation period . This argument has been unanimously rejected by
the courts : Weir v . Lazarus, [1964] 1 O.R . 158, aff'd without reasons, [1964]
I O.R . 205 (C.A .) ; Danylchuk v . Taylor, [1950] 2 W.W.R. 331, 58 Man. R.
45 ; Vancourer (City) v . Krauss (1963), 43 W.W.R . 71 (B.C.S.C .) .
Unanimity has not prevailed, however, when the problem has been a
slightly different one: where the defendant has delivered a counterclaim,
and then sought leave to amend the allegations therein after the 12 month
limitation period . In Ontario an argument relying on the Weldon v .
Neal principle was initially rejected by Master Marriott on the basis (which
seems quite sound) that where the counterclaim is for damages arising out
of the same accident as the plaintiffs claim, the legislation provides that
the 12 month limitation period is not applicable to the counterclaim :
Innainorato v . Sution, [1961] O.W.N . 306 . But shortly thereafter the same
Master reversed his position and concluded that delivery of a counterclaim
exhausts the defendant's freedom from the 12 month limitation period
given him by the legislation : Carter v . Dodd, supra, footnote 26 . This prin-
ciple has been restated, though never actually applied, in subsequent Ontario
cases : Poste v. Gregoire, supra, footnote 25 ; Weir v . Lazarus, supra . A
contrary conclusion, not referred to in any of the Ontario cases, had been
earlier arrived at by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
Alberta: Buck v . hinsella (1958), 25 W.W.R . 593 . That court took the
position, which seems clearly correct, that under the legislation the 12
month limitation period is made entirely inapplicable to a counterclaim for
damages arising out of the same accident as the plaintiff's claim.
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However, in recent years the courts have looked upon such
arguments with disfavour.
In -the Prairie provinces actions are no longer commenced by
means of a writ bearing a general endorsement. Instead, in
Saskatchewan" the first step in an action is the issuing of 'a writ
with a full statement of claim attached, while in Alberta39 and
Manitoba" proceedings are simply commenced by the issuing of a
statement of claim. These procedures have provided defendants
with the basis of a formalistic argument : if the statement- of claim
is defective in that it technically fails to state a good cause of
action then any later amendment to cure the defect (even if a
minor one) must set up for the first time a cause of action, and
if it comes after the expiration of the limitation period it must be
refused. The effect of this argument, if accepted by a court, is that
the statute of limitations continues to run, even after the com-
mencement of an action, until a technically good statement of
claim is filed. The cruel logic and harsh consequences of such
reasoning, while adopted in some earlier cases, 41 now seems
generally to have fallen into disfavour. In Saskatchewan it has
been rejected by statute.42 In the other Prairie provinces the courts
have refused to accept the reasoning where it would operate to
throw the plaintiff out of court because of the omission of a
merely formal or minor allegation .43 ''
38 Sask . Queen's Bench Rules, 1961, rs 6-7.
39 Alberta Supreme Court Rules, 1969, r. 6(l) .
40 Man. Queen's Bench Rules, 1968, r. 6.
41 Shtitz v. C.N.R ., [1927] 1 W.W.R. 193 (Sask. C.A .) (Fatal accident
action, brought by the administrator claiming damages on behalf of himself
and four infant sisters of the deceased . The statute gave no right of action
to the administrator or the sisters of the deceased as such . Amendment to
add the essential allegation that he was the deceased's father and that the
deceased had stood in loco parentis to his young sisters-both being classes
of persons given rights of action under the legislation-refused) ; McKerrel
v. City of Edmonton (1912), 3 W.W.R . (Alto S.C .) (Action, for death of
a child brought by the father. The statute required that such an action be
brought by the administrator, and the plaintiff was refused an amendment
to allege that he was the administrator and brought the action in that
capacity) ; Stivindell v. Northern Elevator Co ., [1928] 3 W.W.R . 433 (Sask.
C.A .) ; Reynolds v. McPhalen (1908), 7 W.W.R . 380 (B.C . Full Ct) . See
also Tannas v. Mosser, [1930] 1 W.W.R . 738 (Sask. C.A .) .
4-' Queen's Bench Act, R.S .S ., 1965, c. 73, s. 44 (11), see infra, Appendix,
item 4. This provision was first introduced in 1940 .
43 Thornton v. Milne (1968), 69 D.L.R . (2d) 709, 63 W.W.R . 768
(Man . C.A .) (Motor vehicle case in which plaintiff failed to allege that
Dl drove with knowledge and consent of D_, the owner. Amendment
allowed) ; Markarsky v. C.P.R . (1904), 15 Man. R. 53 (K.B .) ; Miller v.
C.P.R ., supra, footnote 3 . In Manitoba as early as 1937, Trueman 7.A .
rejected the doctrine by treating a defective statement of claim as a writ
of summons: Mitchell v. Campbell, supra, footnote 32 .
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In jurisdictions where actions are commenced by a generally
endorsed writ, the omission of an essential allegation from the
statement of claim (for example, in an action for assault) will not
usually leave the plaintiff vulnerable to the type of argument just
discussed. Typically in such jurisdictions his claim will have been
preserved from the bar of the statute by the "umbrella" of the
endorsement on the writ (for instance, the plaintiff's claim is for
damages for assault) . However, an analogous argument has been
used in these juridictions when a material allegation has been
omitted from the endorsement itself . In this type of situation
defendants have argued that the writ is a nullity and incapable
of amendment, or of being cured by the subsequent delivery of a
statement of claim adequately alleging a cause of action . In
essence the defendant contends that the defectively endorsed writ
does not stop the running of the statute of limitations and that no
post-limitation amendment should be permitted .
The cases in which this agrument has been raised have not
been entirely consistent in outcome. In some cases the courts
have held the endorsement to be so defective as to be a nullity,44
while in others a curative amendment has been allowed.45 For-
tunately for the plaintiffs, the great majority of cases have fallen
into this second category and reveal a functional approach to the
problem. The decisions indicate the courts' willingness to look at
all the circumstances to determine whether the defendant actually
knew the case being made against him (for instance, through prior
correspondence)46 or whether it could be inferred that he must
have been aware of the nature of the claim." This represents a
44 Elloway v. B.C . Electric Rlwy Co . Ltd. (1956), 4 D.L.R . (2d) 734
(B.C.S.C .), aff'd C.A., unreported judgment, September 19th, 1958,
(Personal injury action in which the writ was merely endorsed "Plaintiff's
claim is for damages" . Held that this was incapable of amendment by
a statement of claim delivered more than five years after the issue of the
writ . A six-month limitation period applied to the action); Wilson v. Janzen
(1967), 64 D.L.R . (2d) 669 (B.C.S.C.) .
45 Nelson v. Maglio (1964), 44 D.L.R . (2d) 484, 47 W.W.R . 505
(B .C .C.A .) (Personal injury action, failure to allege negligence of defen-
dant . Defect held to be curable by amendment) ; Accord : Reece v. Brown
(1961), 38 W.W.R . 122 (B.C .S .C .) (Personal injury action, failure to
allege defendant liable as driver's principal) ; Gerard v. Frketich (1964),
45 D.L.R . (2d) 155 (B.C .S .C .) (Personal injury action, failure to allege
that D. liable because D~ drove with his consent) ; Joseph v. Brown,
unreported decision of B.C.C.A ., Nov. 21st, 1958, reproduced in part in
Gerard v. Frketich, supra, (Personal injury action, failure to allege
negligence) ; Tierney v. Jameson (1957), 21 W.W.R . 428 (B.C.S.C .) .
46 As in Pontin v. Wood, supra, footnote 23, cited with approval in
several of the B .C . decisions, in preceding footnote . See also Wilson v.
Janzen (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 669 (B.C .S.C.) .
47 See, e.g ., the Nelson, Joseph and Gerard cases, supra, footnote 45 .
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sound approach to the problem . It recognizes that if an action
has been timely commenced and the defendant has knowledge of
the basis of the plaintiffs claim (albeit conveyed impliedly or
informally), he has received all the protection that the statute of
limitations was designed to give him .
B. Amendments Changing the Parties to an Action .
The major extension of the Weldon v. Neal principle has been
its application to situations in which it has been successfully
argued that the requested amendment involves a change of parties
to the action . A general rule has developed that the addition or
substitution of a new party, either plaintiff or defendant, after
the limitation period has expired will not be permitted . To allow
such amendments, it is said, would be to deprive the existing or
new defendant of his defence under the limitation provision.4s
In certain situations (which, however, arise quite rarely in
practice) such an extension of the Weldon v. Neal principle is
justified on either an analytical or functional view. For instance,
if A commences an action for personal injuries against B and
then later seeks, after the limitation period, to add as a defendant
C-someone who was until then unrelated to and unaware of
the litigation-it seems quite proper that the request be refused .
The refusal may be unfortunate for A if it has transpired that C
(for instance, a repairman) and not B (the owner and driver of
the car) was the person whose neglect caused his injuries . But
to decide otherwise is not only to allow the setting-up of a claim
which is conceptually statute barred, it is to defeat the very
purpose of statutory limitations-timely notice to the defendant
that a claim is being asserted against him . 49
Analogous situations can arise where an amendment seeks to
add a plaintiff-if A commences a timely action against B and
subsequently an attempt is made to join C (heretofore a stranger
to the litigation) as a plaintiff in the action in order to assert a
different claim to that being made by A. This might occur, for
48 This extension seems first to have been made in Hudson v. Perny-
hough (1889), 61 L.T. 722, but Mabro v. Eagle, Star and British Dominion
Ins. Co ., [1932] 1 K.B . 485, is most often cited as authority for the exten-
sion .
49 Cases of this kind arise not infrequently in practice and the courts
consistently refuse leave to amend. See the cases referred in infra, footnote
80 . But in one sense even these cases are not completely free from difficulty
for frequently the new defendant is still subject to being drawn into the
litigation, through being made a third-party by the original defendant. If
in such cases he has to defend the third-party claim is it really unfair to
require him to defend the plaintiff's claim? This matter is discussed further,
infra, footnote 187.
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example, where A and C were co-passengers in a car involved in
an accident. A makes a claim against B, negotiates with him and
finally sues . At least in circumstances where C has never notified
B that he is making a claim it would be improper to allow C, after
the limitation period, to join in A's action in order to assert a claim
for his own personal injuries . In such a case B would clearly be
deprived of the protection the statute of limitations was intended
to give him if C were allowed to be added in this way.
In practice, however, "core" cases of the kind just described
are rare . The vast majority of reported cases in which it is argued
that a change of parties is being sought by a post-limitation
amendment, merely involves non-prejudicial errors in the naming
or choosing of the parties."'" In these cases a conceptual argument
can often be made that a statute barred claim is being set up .
Almost invariably, however, the new or old defendant will suffer
no actual prejudice for typically he has become aware, through
notice received prior to the running of the statute, that an attempt
is being made to assert a particular claim against him. Some fine
distinctions appear in the cases and they are often difficult to
reconcile. In the final analysis the outcome of any particular case
usually depends upon which factor the court gives most weight to
-the fact that the old or new defendant will suffer no actual
prejudice, or the argument that conceptually the requested amend-
ment will involve the addition out of time of a new party. How-
ever, there now appears to be emerging a dichotomy between the
older and the more recent cases-the latter giving much greater
effect to the functional consideration of lack of actual prejudice.
Indeed, in two recent decisions"' the Supreme Court of Canada
has moved in the direction of making the presence or absence of
actual prejudice the basic test .
(i) Amendments Objected to as Involving a Change of Plaintiffs .
The common factor among nearly all of the reported cases
dealing with a change of plaintiff is that they involve nothing more
than a non-prejudicial error in naming the original plaintiff.
Unlike the cases involving a change of defendant, attempts to
bring in total strangers as plaintiffs to the litigation, by amend-
ment are rare ."1= Typically what occurs is that after the com-
50 Or some other merely technical defect in the proceedings . See, e.g .,
the "capacity" and "nullity" cases discussed, infra, text following footnote
92 .
51 See the cases discussed, infra, text at footnotes 64 and 66 .
But see Saskatchewan v. Buskas, [19731 3 W.W.R . 4 (Alta S.C .)
(Personal injury action by A against B . B counterclaimed attempting to
join C, his passenger and who was not a co-defendant, as a co-plaintiff by
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mencement of the action it becomes apparent that the plaintiff's
legal advisors were mistaken in their description of the plaintiff,
or made a mistake as to which of several closely related legal
entities actually possessed the title to sue. Subsequently, when an
amendment is sought to correct the error by changing the style
of cause the defendant objects: he argues that, the limitation
period having expired, such a step would involve the setting up
of a statute-barred claim.
Essentially, the outcome has depended upon the court's
characterization of the nature of the plaintiff's error and the effect
of the requested amendment. If it concludes that A, someone
who lacked the necessary title to sue, was wrongly chosen as
plaintiff and an attempt is now being made to substitute B as
plaintiff, the amendment has usually been refused. However, if
the court is satisfied that the intention throughout was that A
should be plaintiff but he has been in someway misnamed, an
amendment to correct the "misnomer" is permitted.
The 1962 Ontario decision in the Western Freight Lines"
case is representative of the courts' handling of the problem in
situations where they have concluded that the case is one of
choosing the wrong plaintiff. In Western Freight Lines, litigation
was commenced to recover for the damage done to a police car
in an automobile accident, the action being brought in the name
of the "Board of Commissioners of Police of the Corporation
of the Township of London" as owners of the car. It was later
discovered that the Board of Police Commissioners were mere
baflees of the car which was in fact owned by the Township
Corporation, and the defendants denied the right of the Police
Commissioners to bring the action . In response, the plaintiffs
moved to amend, after the expiration of the statutory period,
to change the name of the plaintiff to the "Corporation of the
Township of London". A majority of the Court of Appeal took
the position that since it was clear from affadavit evidence that,
the Board of Commissioners had been deliberately (though mis-
takenly) chosen as plaintiff the case was not one of misnomer,
counterclaim after the limitation period had expired. Held : C's counterclaim,
must be struck out as not authorized by the Rules) . Cf., Makarchzrk v.
Pollard (1957), 13 W.W.R . 617 (Alta App. Div.) where the same con-
clusion, on slightly different facts, seems unjust . There, the counterclaim
had been asserted before the expiry of the limitation period. Consequently
C had attempted to commence an action, and A had clear notice of the
claim, within the limitation period .
53 Board of Commissioners of Police of the Corporation of the Township
of London v. Western Freight Lines Ltd., [1962] O.R . 948, 34 D.L.R. (2d)
689 (C.A .) .
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as to which an amendment might be had." Rather, it was a clear
attempt to substitute one party for another and this was not
permissible after the expiration of the limitation period . Further-
more, they held, if the present plaintiffs were to attempt to recover
by alleging or proving that they were bailees rather than owners,
they would be stopped from so doing because that also would
involve the setting up of a new cause of action now statute
barred. A vigorous dissent from the majority opinion was pre-
sented by MacKay J. A. He denied that the amendment would set
up a new cause of action . The action, he insisted, remained the
same . It was still one for damages for injury to the very same
automobile. The amendment requested was merely one as to the
name of the owner of the vehicle and this he felt should clearly
be granted under the broad general amendment power55 bolstered
here by the specific power given to the court by the rules in respect
of the change of parties in the case of a bona fide mistake.5a
54 It is submitted that the court's attitude to this affidavit, and the
conclusion they drew from it, are most unfortunate . The purpose for which
the affidavit (made by the plaintiff's solicitor) was filed seems quite clear;
it was to show that a mistake had been made and how they had come to
make it. The affidavit deposed that the solicitor had understood, at the
time the action was commenced, that the Police owned the car but sub-
sequently they had discovered the vehicle had been purchased by, and was
owned by the Township, and the Police were mere bailees. From this
reasonable straightforward document Laidlaw J. A. drew the conclusion that
"it is perfectly apparent . . . that [the solicitor] recognized the existence
of two separate and distinct legal entities" one of which was the real owner
and the other a mere bailee . He then stated that this "fact was known or
ought to have been known to the solicitors" (emphasis added) who prepared
the writ . After thus recognizing the solicitor's knowledge might at best be
constructive he stated "it must be concluded that the [Board of Commis-
sioners of Police] was deliberately chosen by the solicitors to be the
plaintiff in the action and likewise that the [Township] should not be named
as a party plaintiff" (emphasis added) . With respect it is submitted that,
at the very least, this is a strained interpretation of the document. For
instance, the document said nothing about recognizing two separate entities
at the time the iorit was issued . It also said nothing about choice, certainly
not deliberate choice . It merely stated that at the relevant time, the issue
of the writ, the solicitor understood the Police owned the car and sub-
sequently they found out the true facts-that they had made a mistake,
and the Township and not the Police owned the car. This lengthy analysis
of this aspect of Western Freight, and how the court came to lay emphasis
on the aspect of choice rather than that of mistake, seems necessary in
view of the fact that recently, in Witco Chemical Co ., Canada Ltd. v. Town
of Oakville (1974), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 413 (S.C.C.), Spence J. saw fit to
distinguish this case, relying on the conclusions of Laidlaw J.A . just dis-
cussed, rather than to overrule it . See infra, text at footnote 67 .
55 Ont. Rules of Practice, r. 185, reproduced in part infra, text at foot-
note 129 .
56 Ont. Rules of Practice, r. 136, reproduced infra, footnote 59 .
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In his opinion the amendment should have been granted since
the defendants were at all times fully aware of the nature of the
claim being made against them and were not misled or prejudiced
in their defence by the misnaming of the owner of the motor car.
It is interesting to note that in two subsequent cases courts
have found little difficulty in dealing differently with amendment
issues very similar to those faced by the court in the Western
Freight Lines case.57 However, the disposition of many, but not
all, of the cases where the wrong person has been mistakenly
chosen as plaintiff has been similar to that in Western Freight
Lines. 5s Though the claim in such cases remains exactly the same
57 Canada Malting Co . Ltd. v . Burnett Steamship Co . Ltd., [1965] 2 Ex.
C.R . 257 (Dist . Ct Judge in Admiralty) (Action in respect of damage to
cargo, brought by the shipper . Amendment granted, to add as a plaintiff
the real owner of the cargo at the time it was damaged . In the judgment
reference is made, with approval, only to the dissenting judgment of McKay
J.A. in Western Freight) ; Thorne v . MacGregor, supra, footnote 26 (Mere
Uailee permitted to add a claim for property damage to, his claim for
personal injuries) .
ss For cases in accord, involving similar facts see, McPhee v . Ahern
(1964), 49 W.W.R . 189 (B.C.S.C .) ("Sicks Brewery Ltd ." named as plain-
tiff . Amendment to change description of plaintiff to "Sicks Breweries
(Alberta) Ltd .", a subsidiary of the original plaintiff, refused) ; Dietrich
Collins Equipment Ltd . v. Ed Huss Logging Co . Ltd . (1969), 68 W.W.R .
366, 5 D.L.R. (3d) 87 (B.C.S.C.) (Action commenced in the name of
D.C.E . Ltd . In between the date on which the cause of action arose and
the date of the commencement of proceedings D.C.É. Ltd . amalgamated
with P.E. Ltd . An amendment to substitute P.E . Ltd . a s plaintiff, refused) ;
Crozier v . O'Connor, [1960] O.W.N. 352 (C.A .) (After the commencement
of a motor vehicle action it appeared that the plaintiff's son, not the plaintiff,
owned the vehicle in question . Motion to add the son as a plaintiff, refused
as involving the addition of a party out of time) ; Frank G . Rainsford Ltd.
v . Longland Bros . Logging & Trucking Co . (1969), 72 W.W.R . 399
(B.C.S.C .) (Contract action commenced by F.G.R . Ltd ., a "one man com-
pany" . When it later became apparent that debt was owed, not to the
company, but to F.G.R . in person, a requested amendment to substitute
F.G.R . for the company as plaintiff was refused) ; Ferguson v. Bryans
(1904), 15 Man . R . 171 (K.B .) . See also the decisions of the Ontario Court
of Appeal, later reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada, in Ladouceur v.
Howard, [1972] 1 O.R. 488, and Witco Chemical Co . Can . . Ltd. v . Oakville,
[1973] 2 O.R . 467 . In the following cases the defendant's argument that the
named plaintiff lacked title to sue, or that the plaintiff should be prevented
from amending was rejected . U.M. Sales v . Scottish Metro. Assur . Co .
(1922), 22 O.W.N. 327 (H.C.) ; Blair v . Official Administrator (1964),
49 D.L.R. (2d) 478 (B .C .S.C.) ; Jonasson v . Royal Transportation Ltd .,
[1936] 3 W.W.R . 540 (Man . C.A .) (Late filing of father's consent to act
as infant plaintiff's next friend held not to involve assertion of a statute-
barred claim) ; Canning v . Avigdor, [1961] O.W.N . 59 (C.A .) and Betorna
Nth . American Ltd . v . Barrett Spun Concrete Poles Ltd ., [1970] 1 O.R .
72 (H.C.) (Equitable assignor permitted to be joined as co-plaintiff by
post-limitation amendment) .
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one as was timely asserted by the original plaintiff, so that the
defendant has been in no way actually prejudiced by the requested
joinder or substitution, the courts have generally given weight to
the conceptual argument that a party is being added out of time,
and refused the amendment. One might expect that the conceptual
argument used in these cases would have little chance of success
in view of the specific power given to the courts, by the rules,
to grant an amendment changing the parties in the case of a bona
fide mistake : 5 3 particularly since this power is supported by a
sweeping general directive on the subject of amendment.6°
The outcome of the amendment issue has usually been dif-
ferent, however, where the court has characterized the mistake as
merely one of misnaming the plaintiff rather than one of choosing
the wrong plaintiff . 6l If the court is satisfied that all times it was
intended that a particular person should be the plaintiff but a
mistake has been made as to the name of the plaintiff (a "mere
59 "The court may, at any stage of the proceedings, order that the
name of a plaintiff or defendant improperly joined be struck out, and
that any person who ought to have been joined or whose presence is
necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to
adjudicate upon the questions involved in the action, be added or, where
an action has through a bona fide mistake been commenced in the name
of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been
commenced in the name of the right plaintiff, the court may order any
person to be substituted or added as plaintiff" . Ont. Rules of Practice,
r. 136 (1) . For similar, though not identical, provisions, see e.g ., B.C .,
Supreme Court Rules 1961, 0.16, r. 11 ; Sask ., Queen's Bench Rules 1961,
40 .
GO Ont. Rules of Practice, r. 185, quoted in part in the text infra, foot-
note 129. See footnote 1, supra, for citations of similar rules in the other
provinces. See also Ont. Rules of Practice, r. 186.
et Pacific Lime Co . Ltd . v . Vancouver Tug Boat Co . Ltd ., [1955] Ex .
C.R. 142 (B.C . Adm. Dist .) (Plaintiff, whose real name was Pacific Lime
Co ., Ltd., issued a writ showing its name as Pacific Coast Lime Co . Ltd.-
there being no such company. Amendment granted as being mere correction
of a misnomer) ; Chisholm v . Wodlengor (1913), 5 W.W .R . 793 (Man .
K.B .) ; A .C . v. Patterson, [1946] 3 W.W.R . 279 (Alta App. Div.) (Suit by
the federal government in which plaintiff was described as the "Dept . of
Nat'l Defence for the Dominion of Canada" rather than the "A.G . of
Canada". Appellate court divided equally on the question and lower court's
order granting the amendment thus allowed to stand) ; Dill v. Alves,
[19681 1 O.R. 58, 65 D.L.R . (2d) 416 (C.A .) (Action for personal
injuries in which the son, Edwin R. Dill, the driver of the car, was mis-
takenly named as plaintiff rather than the father, Edward Dill, a passenger
in the car who sustained damages both personal and to the car. Amendment
allowed as a mere misnomer which did not, in the circumstances, mislead
the defendant) . But contrast the Ontario cases, infra, footnote 72, refusing
leave to amend where the misnomer has been of a sole proprietor suing as
plaintiff. For cases involving the misnomer of defendants see infra, foot-
notes 82 et seq .
r.
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misnomer") then an amendment will be allowed, even though
the effect appears to be the substitution of another as plaintiff
after the limitation period . While this misnomer principle can be
thus stated quite simply, in practice it has often proved to be an
elusive and. difficult one to. apply with any confidence as to its
outcome.c,2 However, in two recent cases" the Supreme Court of
Canada (unanimously reversing decisions of the Ontario Court
of Appeal and granting leave to amend) has clarified the principle.
In so doing the court put forward an essentially functional test for
the application of the principle, one that should prove relatively
easy to apply.
Both these cases had caused difficulty for. the lower courts
primarily because the basic facts of each more closely resembled
the mistaken choice of plaintiff than the misnomer cases ; in both
of the cases there were two existing and distinct legal entities who
could have been named as plaintiff, and in each case thé wrong
entity was originally named. In the first of the two cases, Ladou-
ceur v. Howard," a father (Conrad Joseph L.) and son (Paul L.)
had been driving together in a car involved in a collision with the
defendant. Although his car was damaged, the father suffered
no personal injuries whereas the son did. However, by mistake
the son's lawyer issued the writ, claiming damages for personal
injuries, in the father's name. An amendment was sought to
substitute the son for the father as plaintiff. In granting leave to
amend Spence d., speaking for the court, looked at all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the case . These revealed that throughout
the defendants' insurer had negotiated only with respect to the
personal injuries claim of the son. Consequently, on receipt of the
writ, the defendant would have realized the mistake in. the style of
cause. And since the "prime principle" in such cases, stated
Spence"Y .,6' "is that the Court should amend, where the opposite
party has not been misled or substantially injured by the error",
the amendment should be allowed, for here there was a lack of
any evidence that the defendant had been misled or substantially
injured.
62 For evidence of this, one need only compare the judgments in Western
Freight Lines, supra, footnote 53, Chretieu v. Hermann and Plaza, (19691
2 O.R. 339 (C.A .), Dill v. Alves, supra, footnote 61, Ladouceur v. Howarth
and Witco Chemical Co. v. Oakville, supra, footnote 58, all decisions of
the Ontario Court of Appeal given in the last decade . The major difficulty
encountered has been determining just when a plaintiff has been merely
misnamed as opposed to wrongly chosen, and formulating a coherent and
consistent test for making that determination .
E33 See, infra, text at footnotes 64 and 66 .
6F (1973), 41 D.L.R . (3d) 416.
65 Ibid ., at p. 420.
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The second case is Witco Chemical Co., Canada Ltd. v . Town
of Oakville .1~11 There the difficulty was that one day before the
issuing of the writ naming Witco as plaintiff, that company had
amalgamated with the Argus Chemical Canada Ltd., under the
latter name, a fact which at the time was unknown to the lawyer
handling the litigation . Subsequently, after the passage of the very
short limitation period, the lawyer became aware of the amalgama-
tion and sought leave to correct the style of cause to name the new
amalgamated company as plaintiff. As in Ladouceur Spence J.,
again writing the judgment of the court, looked at all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the case and stressed the broad language
of the RulesG7 governing amendment . He concluded that here the
solicitor's error was clearly a bona fide mistake within the meaning
of the rule relating to a change of parties . Moreover, the basic
principle (reflected in the amendment rules) was "that the Court
should amend where the opposite party has not been misled or
substantially injured by the error" . Spence J . concluded that, in
the circumstances, "the defendant could not have been in any way
misled or prejudiced" by the plaintiff's error, and leave to amend
was granted .
In both of these cases the Supreme Court of Canada stressed
that the important question was whether, in the circumstances, the
opposite party had been misled or substantially injured by the
error . This is a sound approach to the problem . Moreover, it is
submitted that the above test is a sufficient test, one which if
applied alone and without further qualification could provide a
satisfactory resolution of all cases involving a misdescription of
the parties . But unfortunately in his judgment in Witco Spence
J . introduced a qualification . Regrettably he saw fit to distinguish,
rather than to over-rule, the Ontario Court of Appeal's earlier
decision in Western Freight Lines."" By so doing he appears to
have preserved the dichotomy between the mistaken choice of
plaintiff cases (for instance, Western Freight Lines) and the
misnomer cases.
With respect, it is submitted that there is no meaningful
difference in principle between the two types of case . To continue
to differentiate these cases only perpetuates injustice and prolongs
6 6 (1974), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 413 . Contrast Dietrich Collins, supra, foot-
note 58 not referred to by the Supreme Court in Witco.
67 Quoted, supra, footnote 59 and text at footnote 130, infra.
6s Discussed supra, text at footnote 53 . Spence J . distinguished Western
Freight on the ground that there the solicitor issuing the writ knew of the
existence of both the Township and the Police and chose to name the
latter as plaintiff (see'discussion supra, footnote 54) whereas the solicitor
in Witco exercised no choice because he only knew of one company,
Witco Chemical Co.
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confusion." In one situation the plaintiff is mistaken as to who has
title to sue and in the other he is mistaken as to the correct name
of the plaintiff. Admittedly the cases can be distinguished: on the
basis that in one the solicitor intended (albeit mistakenly) to name
the original plaintiff, whereas in the other he intended all along
to name a particular person as plaintiff. But, it is submitted, this
distinction is, or should be, of no consequence. In any event, it is
one that breaks down if the cases on misnomer of plaintiffs and
defendants are viewed together .7° In both types of case the plaintiff
has laboured under a mistake.71 Provided the opposing party has
not been misled or injured by the error in such a way as to be
now prejudiced in defending on the merits, the courts should be
unconcerned with the nature of the plaintiff's error.
It is to be hoped that in the future the courts will abandon
this distinction between misnomer and the mistaken choice of
plaintiff. It is also to be hoped that with the decisions in Ladouceur
and Witco we will see the demise of -the unjust doctrine, developed
by the Ontario Court of Appeal, that an action mistakenly brought
in the name of a sole proprietor is a nullity and incapable of being
cured by amendment."
69 Reference has already been made to the difficulty the courts have
experienced in distinguishing between cases of misnomer and those involving
a mistaken choice of plaintiff, see supra, footnote 62 .
70 Quite properly the courts assume that the "misnomer" cases, whether
of a plaintiff or of a defendant should all be governed by the same prin-
ciples (see, e .g., Witco, supra, footnote 66) . In fact, however, this is not so.
On close analysis,, while the change of plaintiff cases are arguably con-
sistent with , the "deliberate choice of the wrong party" versus "the mere
mistake in naming the party" distinction (compare the cases referred to
in footnotes 58 and 61, supra), the cases involving a change of defendant .
are not. For example in the Chretien case, (discussed, infra, footnote 87,
cited with approval in Witco) the court characterized the mistake as one of
misnomer and granted leave to amend . Yet in that case what the plaintiff had
done was directly analogous to what had been done in Western Freight Lines,
and similar cases, where leave to amend was refused : i .e ., he deliberately
chose X as defendant because he believed, mistakenly, that X enjoyed a
particular status-that he was owner of the car . See also the Gaytee case,
discussed, infra, footnote 87 . It is submitted that the true common factor
among the decided cases granting amendment on the basis of a misnomer is
not that they involved a mere mistake in naming the party, rather than a
deliberate choice of the wrong party, but simply that in all of the cases no
prejudice would result from . granting the amendment.
%1 See the discussion supra, footnote 54 . As we shall see, infra, Part III,
even the mistake element- should not be considered, essential . The crucial
question should be, mistake or no mistake, will the defendant suffer actual
prejudice as a result of the amendment .
72 The Ontario Rules make no provision for an action by a sole
proprietor to be brought in the firm name, and the courts have held that it
is improper-to do so . rn a number of early cases sole proprietors who sued
in the firm's name had been given leave to amend, Lang v. Thompson
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The cases discussed in this section up to this point have
merely involved requests to substitute another plaintiff for the
one originally named, rather than the actual addition of an
extra plaintiff . But requests to add, by post-limitation amendment,
another plaintiff while retaining the original party, have occurred
though such cases are less common. A unifying element among
these cases is that they all involve situations where the claim
is one that would normally be enforceable by a single plaintiff,
but through some circumstance, or rule of law, the presence of
more than one plaintiff is necessary to enforce the total claim.
The most numerous of these cases involve personal injury
actions brought by married women suing alone. In such cases
the wife has been met with the argument that, to the extent that
she seeks to recover expenses which are necessaries, these are
the legal responsibility of the husband and only he may sue
for them . In his absence, it is argued, these expenses . are not
recoverable .7 -1 To overcome this difficulty married women have
requested leave to amend to add their husband as co-plaintiff .
Where the limitation period has expired at the time of the request
it has been argued that such an amendment cannot be permitted .
In two British Columbia cases this argument has been accepted
and leave to amend refused.74 However, in a recent Ontario
(1895), 16 P.R . 516; Standard Leather Co . v . Smith Transport Ltd .,
[1940] O.W.N . 500 (Master) . And see also Cadesky v . Dover, [1945]
O.W.N . 138 (Master) and Lloyd and Co . v . Scully (1912-1913), 4 O.W.N .
1404 (Master), However, in 1948 the Ontario Court of Appeal held that
an action by a sole proprietor brought in the firm name is a nullity (unless,
so it would appear, the sole proprietor's name forms part of the firm's
name) and incapable of amendment. Kaltenback v . Frolic industries,
[1948] O.R . 116, [19481 1 D.L.R . 689. Eigh t years later when asked to
reconsider this question the court declined to do so : Robertson and Son v .
Blonski, [1956] O.W.N . 642 (C.A .) . The Kaltenback case, and a subsequent
decision, recognize an exception to the rule where the sole proprietor's
name forms part of the firm name : O. C. Couch Plumbing v . Target
Textiles, [1969] 1 O.R. 735 (C.A .) . With Kaltenback contrast B.C.
Furniture Co . v . Tugmell (1900), 7 B.C.R . 36, (C.A .) and Skyline Associ-
ates v, Small, [19751 1 W.W.R . 385 (B .C .S .C .) and cases there cited .
7%" This argument has been accepted in numerous cases, see, e.g ., Oliversen
v. Mills (1964), 50 D.L.R . (2d) 768 (B.C.S.C .) and cases there cited;
Hallier v . Kcrcn (1968), 66 D.L.R . (2d) 750, 63 W.W.R. 204 (B.C .S.C.) ;
Accaputo v . Sinianorskls, [19731 O.R . 368 (H.C.) . However, in
several recent cases the difficult situation in which this rule places the mar-
ried woman suing alone has been alleviated by holding that the wife can
herself recover the expenses, if she can show that she assumed the legal
liability to pay for them, or did in fact pay for them: Lang v . Garnbareri,
[1968] 2 O.R . 736 (H .C.) ; Andrews v . Arnot (1972), 27 D.L.R . (3d) 49
(B.C .S .C .) ; Gagnon v . Ryland (1972), 28 D.L.R . (3d) 504 (B.C .S.C .) .
7} Hallier v . Kercn, ibid. ; Fraser v . Harrison (1968), 65 W.W.R . 624
(B.C .S.C .) .
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case75 Galligan J: . refused to follow these decisions and granted
leave to add the husband. Galligan J. pointed out that the
defendant had received timely notice that the wife was injured
by his negligence and he must have known that there would
likely be expenses arising from those injuries . Accordingly, the
interests of justice required that the husband be added as a party
notwithstanding the expiry of the limitation period . In an earlier
Ontario case-,6 a similar, sensible, approach had been taken
where the problem was the analogous one of the' father's absence
from a suit by an infant for personal injuries . In order to permit
the recovery of the child's medical expenses the father was added
as a plaintiff though the limitation period had expired.
The same type of functional approach is also evident in two
further recent cases, 77 again from Ontario, where the addition
of a new party plaintiff might be considered' "more extreme"
than in the foregoing cases. Both involved -actions by the Ontario
Hospital Services Commission (O.H.S.C.), which is empowered
to sue for expenditures it has made on behalf of injured persons,
if such persons do not themselves institute actions within a certain
time . After such actions .had been commenced by O.H.S.C ., and
after the expiry of the limitation period, the injured person sought
to join in the actions to claim for his own damages. In both
cases the court held, aided by special legislative provisions, that
the joinder was proper notwithstanding the expiry of the limita-
tion period . The essence of the court's reasoning, in the face of
the argument that this involved the setting up of statute-barred
claims, was that in the circumstances there was but one cause
of action-in negligence for personal injury to the injured person7$
-and the timely issuance of the writ by the' O.H.S.C . informed the
defendant that an action was being brought in respect of the
personal injuries . Consequently, the defendant could not contend
that he would be prejudiced by having to now meet the claim
of the injured person for his own damages.,9
jai Accaputo v. Simanovskis, supra, footnote 73 (and see also the earlier
case of Silic v. Ottawa Transport Corntnissiort, [1963] 2 O.R . 477 (H.C.)) .
In Accaputo it was stressed, however, that the husband could recover only
expenses and could not assert any claim "of his own", such as for con-
sortium.
7c Curran v. Rudyk, June 29th, 1970 (H.C .) unreported but discussed in
Accaputo, supra, footnote 73 .
75' Ont. Hosp . Services Comm . v. .Reg. of Motor Vehicles, [1969] 1 O.R .
666 (H.C .) ; Ont. Hosp . Services Cornet . v. Barsoski, [1973] . 3 O.R. 720
78 Similar reasoning was used (in different factual contexts) in Cahoon
v. Franks,, supra, footnote 26, Accaputo, supra, footnote . 73, .and in Curran
v. Rudyk, supra, footnote 76 .
71) See, infra, footnote 179 for - a criticism of these two cases.
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(ii) Amendments Objected to as Involving the Addition of a
Defendant.
Cases involving a change of defendants out of time fall into
two distinct categories : those where the plaintiff seeks to draw
into the litigation someone who was until then unconnected
with it, and those where the plaintiff, having initially in some
way misnamed his defendant, seeks to rename the party. Obviously
the functional considerations differ in the two types of case .
Where aperson has heretofore been unconnected with the litigation
there is a real likelihood of prejudice if joinder is permitted.
But this is not usually so where the plaintiff merely seeks to
correct a misdescription of his defendant . Although a functional
analysis is not always apparent in the cases, the courts' handling
of these cases reflects this dichotomy: leave to amend is refused
in the first category but is generally granted in cases in the
second category .
It has already been observed that in the case law relating to
change of plaintiff, attempts to bring in parties who were, up
to that point, unconnected with the litigation are rare. With
regard to attempts to add defendants, however, the situation is
otherwise. Not infrequently plaintiffs have sought to add as
defendants, by post-limitation amendment, persons who were
total strangers to the litigation . Typically, this has occurred in
negligence actions when the plaintiff belatedly discovers that
someone other than the named defendant may be liable (for
instance, a repairer or the authority charged with maintaining the
road), or that the named defendant is not who the plaintiff sup-
posed him to be (for instance, the owner of the car, or the manu-
facturer of the tires of the car that struck him) . In these cases the
courts have not hesitated to consistently apply prohibition against
joinder out of time . ,10 Probably the person sought to be added in
80 t>'IcCorrnick v . Al: rrison, Tacoma Petroleums Ltd. e t al (1970), 73
W.W.R . 86. 13 D.L.I . (3d) 474 (Man. Q.B .) (Automobile negligence
action : post-limitation ',amendment to add G. and S.-on the theory that
they rather than one of the original defendants F., manufactured the de-
fendant driver's tires-refused) ; Heppel v. Stervart, [19681 S.C.R . 707, 69
D.L.R. (2d) 88 (Motor vehicle case : application to add the repairer of
defendant driver's brakes refused upon a determination that the Highway
Traffic Act's one year limitation period, which had expired, applied . The
decision in Lucyk v . Guslion,aty, [1972] 1 W.W.R . 67 (Man. Q.B .) appears
to have been reached in ignorance of the Heppel decision) ; McMurphy v .
G.M . Can . Ltd . (1969), 5 D.L.R . (3d) 170 (B.C .S .C .) (Unsuccessful
attempt to add seller to an action against manufacturer of defective auto-
mobile) ; Owens v . Calgary Farmer and Calgary Weekly Fariner, [1927]
3 W.W.R . 62 (Alta S.C .) (Request to add another newspaper as a party
defendant to a libel action, refused) ; Figueroa v . Waine, [1968] 2 O.R . 755
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these cases would have been prejudiced by the amendment, in
the sense that they had no notice of the plaintiff's claim before
(C.A .) (Registrar of Motor Vehicles, sued in respect of the negligence of
an unidentified motorist, may not be added after the limitation period . Jones
v. Rapkoski, [1967] 1 O.R . 407, which held to the contrary, overruled. But
contrast Scott v. Whitworth, [19741 6 W.W.R. 740 (Alta App. Div.)) ; B.C .
Airlines Ltd. v. The Queen, [1972] F.C . 64 (Amendment to add air traffic
controllers as defendants in an action against the Crown based on their
negligence, refused) ; Williams v. Davis (1969), 70 W.W.R . 684 (Man .
Q.B .) (Motor vehicle case . After expiry of limitation period plaintiff learned
that defendant was not the owner of the vehicle. Application to add the
owner refused) ; see also Lere v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.
(1968), 69 D.L.R . (2d) 704 (B.C.C.A .) ; Arnold Lumber Ltd. v. Yodoukis,
[1968] 2 O.R. 478 (Master) .
In Quebec, under art. 2231 of the Civil Code, the situation is appar-
ently different, see Martel v. Hotel-Dieu-St . Vallier (1969), 14 D.L.R . (3d)
445 (S.C.C .) (Personal injury action against a hospital and doctor. On
discovery it was learned that the wrong doctor had been sued . Application
to add the proper doctor as defendant, granted, despite the expiry. of the
limitation period) .
In numerous cases attempts have been made to join persons as defen-
dants, or as third parties or both, after the limitation period, pursuant to
the provisions of the Ontario Negligence Act (see now Negligence Act,
R.S .O ., 1970, c. 296) . S. 6 of the Act provides for the joinder of persons
not already parties, as defendants or third parties, if it appears that they
may be wholly or partly responsible for the damages claimed. It has been
held that this section does not permit either a plaintiff (see Lattimor v.
Heaps (1931), 40 O.W.N . 580 (C.A.) and also Beaulieu v. Lavoie (1973),
38 D.L.R . (3d) 157 (N.S . App. Div.)) nor a defendant (see Adams v.
W. J. Hyatt, [1954] O.W.N . 895 (H.C .) ; Kane v. Haman, [1971] 1 O.R .
294 (H.C.)) to add a person as a party defendant after the limitation
period has expired. But because of s. 9 of the Act (and see also the High-
way Traffic Act, supra, footnote 37, s. 146 (3)) a person may be added as
a third party, notwithstanding the expiry of the limitation period : see A.G .
Ontario v. Kibrick, [1974] 4 O.R . (2d) 313 (C.A .) ; Black v. Horseman,
[1974] 4 O.R. .(2d) 188 (Div . Ct) ; Ont. Northland Trans. Comm. v. New,
[1974] 4 O.R. (2d) 56 (Master) ; Judson v. Yasilaras, [1971] 1 O.R. 290
(H.C.) ; Adams v. W. J. Hyatt, supra; Baker v. Bundy, [1972] 4 W.W.R.
632 (Man . Q.B .) . On the whole question see Watson, Borins and Williams,
Canadian Civil Procedure : Cases and Materials (1973), pp . 617-618 . As to
the situation in British Columbia, cf . Johnson v. Vancouver Gen. Hosp .,
[1974] 1 W.W.R . 239 (B.C.C.A.), Uhryn v. B.C . Telephone Ltd., [1973]
5 W.W.R . 758 (B.C .S .C .) and B.C . Hydro v. Kees van Weston, [1974]
3 W.W.R . 20 (B.C .S.C.) . But a defendant may not use the guise of a third
party claim for contribution and indemnity to add in an independent,
statute-barred, claim (e.g ., for his own injuries) against the third-party,
Lardner v. Canada Permanent Trust Co . (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 628 (Man .
Q.13.) .
A total stranger may, however, be joined after the normally applicable
limitation where he is brought in as a defendant by counterclaim and the
provisions of The Highway Traffic Act, supra, s. 146(3) apply: Broadhurst
v. Sartisohn, [1972] 1 O.R . 567 (H.C.) .
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the limitation period expired . 8t Invariably however, the reason
for refusing leave to amend is simply that the application is out
of time, rather than that actual prejudice would result to the
defendant.
Cases in which it has been sought by amendment to correct
a misdescription of a party defendant have been approached
by the courts in much the same way as cases involving a mis
description of the plaintiff. Amendment has been permitted
provided the court is satisfied that it will merely "correct a
misnomer" and will not involve the addition of a new party out
of time . However, on their facts some of the cases are not
easily reconciled with the case law on misnomer of plaintiffs .
In many of the cases it is quite clear that all the plaintiff is doing
is correcting a midescription of the defendant who is already
before the court . (A good example are the numerous cases
arising out of actions against governmental agencies8 ~ an area
in which it is not uncommon for the plaintiff to encounter dif-
ficulties in ascertaining the responsible legal entity,"' or its
s' For a glaring exception see Greig v . Toronto Trans . Comm., [1958]
O.W.N . 480 (C.A . ), rev'ing, [1958] O.W.N . 389 (H .C .) .
s= In addition to the cases cited in the following footnotes see, Collins v .
Haliburton, [1972] 3 O.R . 643 (H.C.) (District Health Unit named as
defendant . Proper defendant was Board of Health of the district health
unit . Amendment permitted) ; Fleming v . Foote, [1973] 6 W.W.R . 48
(B.C .S .C .) (Plaintiff sued a named individual as "Official administrator for
the County of Vancouver, etc ." . In fact the named defendant no longer
existed as a suable entity and the office had been assumed by the Public
Trustee. Amendment to substitute Public Trustee permitted) ; Sabourin v .
Canada Permanent Trust Co ., [1974] 1 W.W.R. 519 (Man . Q.B .) (Plaintiff
sued the estate of S. naming the G.T. Co. as the official administrator .
Subsequently, it was discovered that the official administrator of the estate
was in fact the C.P.T. Co . . Amendment allowed substituting the latter
company as defendant) .
Misnaming the defendant in actions against governmental agencies has
been a pervasive problem in the United States, see Byse, Suing the "Wrong"
Defendant in Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action : Proposals
for Reform (1963), 77 Haiv . L. Rev. 40 . Professor Byse's proposals led to
the enactment of special provisions to deal with the problem. See now, the
United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(c), infra, Appen-
dix, item 1.
sa See e.g ., Durham v . West, [1959] O.W.N . 169 (C.A .) (Action against
a school board was commenced against the individual trustees of the board :
an amendment to substitute the statutory name of the school board per-
mitted) ; Dohertp v. Flagstaff Municipal District (1962), 38 W.W.R . 364
(Alta S.C .) (Action commenced against the "Municipal District of Beaver"
at a time when it had become the County of Beaver, amendment per-
mitted) .
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correct title,$} and where the relevant legislation may confuse
rather than clarify the situation.) 85 In these cases, where there
is actually no change in the parties before the court, the judges
have been very sensitive to the fact that the defendant has not
been misled or prejudiced and an amendment has invariably been
permitted. 80
But a number of cases, while treated by the courts as
instances of misnomer, have quite clearly involved the addition
or substitution of a different and new party defendant, 87 and
s-r See, e.g ., Sleenian v. Foothills School Division No . 58, [19461 1
W.W.R. 145 (Alta S.C .) (Defendant was named as the "Foothills School
Division No . 58" rather than "Board of Trustees of" etc. Amendment
allowed) .
85 In the Sleentan case, ibid ., the court noted the great ambiguity in the
relevant legislation . See also Perepelytz v. Dept . of Highways for Ontario,
[19581 S.C.R . 161 (Action for non-repair of a highway. The relevant legis-
lation was extremely confusing as to the proper name of the defendant.
Amendment eventually allowed, but only after an appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada) .
86 In addition to the governmental agency cases, cited above, see Wil-
lianison v. Headley, [1950] O.W.N . 185 (H.C .) (Writ named as defendant
Howard Edward Headley. Real name of the defendant, who had been duly
served, was Harold Headley. Amendment permitted) ; Russell v. Diplock-
Wright Lumber Co . (1910), 15 B .C.R . 66 (Plaintiff named as defendant
"Diplock-Wright Lumber Co . Ltd." but later discovered that the defendants
were not an incorporated, company but a registered partnership . Amendment
granted) . See also De Laval Co . Ltd. v. Milhoborski, [1926] 1 W.W.R. 305
(B.C.D.C .) and Jackson v. Bubela, [1972] 5 W.W.R . 80, 28 D.L.R . (3d)
500 (B.C.C.A .) .
87 Clark v. Thomas Gaytee Studios Inc., supra, footnote 8 (Plaintiff
mistakenly named as defendant an individual (T.J . Gaytee) whereas the
legal person actually liable to him was an existing "one-man" corporation
of a similar name (T.J . Gaytee Studios Inc.) . Amendment granted to
substitute the corporation for the individual defendant. An employee of the
corporation had misled the -plaintiff as to who should be the defendant.
Also the court was satisfied that the corporation was well apprised of the
litigation when the individual defendant was served with the writ) ; Chretien
v. Herrtnan and Plaza, supra, footnote 62 (An, automobile negligence action
in which an individual, Jose Plaza, was named as the defendant owner,
whereas the true owner was Jose Plaza Co . Ltd.-a company controlled by
the individual of that name . Amendment allowed to substitute the company
as defendant. At the time of the accident the driver of the car had told the
police that Jose Plaza was the owner of the vehicle . The individual, Jose
Plaza, had been duly served with the writ) ; Kirkpatrick v. Slasor, supra,
footnote 8 (Plaintiff was injured while driving as a passenger in a car
driven by Richard B . Slasor (R.H .S .) . Acting on police information
indicating that R.H .S, was the owner of the car, the plaintiff instituted an
action against R.H.S . as both owner and driver of the car. Subsequently, it
was discovered that the R.H.S . who drove the car was not also the owner.
Rather the owner was his father, also called R.H.S . Held, that in the
peculiar and unusual circumstances of the case an amendment should be
allowed to permit the plaintiff to sue both R.H.S .s, since both had in fact
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are not really reconcilable with the supposed state of the law with
regard to misnomer of plaintiffs .s" However, in all of these cases
the persons added by amendment were not total strangers to the
litigation . They were closely related in interest to the defendant
originally named. It could be shown or reasonably assumed
that they had received timely notice of the plaintiffs claim and
in the circumstances they could not argue that they would be
actually prejudiced in defending on the merits . Moreover, in
most of the cases the new defendant had in some way misled
the plaintiff and contributed to his mistake in naming the original
defendant. Though more liberal in outcome" the reasoning in these
cases has not always been as broad and functional as in the
recent cases on the misnomer of plaintiffs."
been served within the limitation period and neither could be said to have
suffered injury) ; Jackson v. Bubela, ibid. (Plaintiff was injured in a
collision with a car owned by B and driven by a man whose identity
could not be discovered . Therefore, on the eve of the limitation period,
she issued a writ against B as owner and "John Doe" as driver of the
vehicle . On discovering the real name of the driver (who was the owner's
brother) the plaintiff was granted leave to substitute his name for that of
John Doe. In granting leave the court pointed out (a) that driver had failed
to make a police report and to give his name to the plaintiff at the scene
of the accident, as he was bound to do, and (b) the defendant driver could
be no way prejudiced by the amendment since he was sued within time and
described in a way that clearly identified him) . Contrast with Chretien,
supra, footnote 62, and Jackson, Lere v. Hertford Accident Co. and Wil-
liatns v. Davis, supra, footnote 80 .
ss See the discussion supra, footnote 70, and accompanying text .
8" Cf . the decision in Western Freight, supra, footnote 53, and the cases
referred to in footnote 58, supra, with the decisions in Chretien, supra, foot-
note 62, and Gaytee, supra, footnote 8. See also the discussion supra,
footnote 70.
90 For example, the exact basis and scope of the decision in Chretien,
supra, footnote 62, is not altogether clear. Given the courts' reasoning,
would the decision have been different, for instance, had the company con-
trolled by Jose Plaza been called Industrial Associates Ltd.? Also many of
the decisions place considerable weight on the defendant's role in misleading
the plaintiff. While undoubtedly a relevant consideration when present, the
absence of this factor should not. as a matter of principle, prejudice the
case for amendment. This is of particular importance in cases where a
plaintiff mistakenly sues :the wrong defendant in a situation in which the
proper defendant is another company closely related in its interests and
activities with the named defendant, e.g ., the plaintiff sues the parent com-
pany rather than a subsidiary . These cases, though not to date evident in
the reported Canadian case law are common in the United States : see e.g .,
Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) : Relation Back of Amend-
ment (1972), 57 Minn . L. Rev. 83, at p. 90. In such cases the fact that
neither defendant has actively misled the plaintiff should be irrelevant, and
the amendment should be granted provided the new defendant had notice
and will not be prejudiced.
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It is to be hoped that in the future the simple, liberal test
suggested by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ladouceur and
Witco91-has the opposite party been misled' or substantially
injured by the amendment?-will be 'applied simpliciter both to
cases involving a change of plaintiff and a change of defendant.
(iii) Cases in Which Amendment Has Been Refused on the
Ground that the Proceedings as Constituted Were a Nullity .
To complete this survey of the Canadian case law reference
must be made to one further group of cases. For the most part
these are cases involving mistakes in the naming of parties, or -
situations where the plaintiff lacks the capacity in which he
purports to sue. A unifying factor in these cases is that the
defendant has, successfully argued that the defect renders the
proceedings a nullity and therefore incapable of amendment. As
a result the plaintiff is left in a situation where his initial action
cannot proceed and the statute of limitations prevents the institu-
tion of a new action . (In some of the cases discussed earlier
this argument has been made, sometimes with success.)D'2 The
cases are generally characterized by reasoning which is extremely
conceptual, functional considerations being completely eschewed,
and typically the results are most unjust since usually the defendant
would suffer no prejudice if the plaintiff were allowed to amend
and proceed.
Leaving aside for a moment those in alack of capacity,
the remainder of the cases mainly have to do with actions by or
against deceased persons or their estates. In Gonzales v. Reid,93
and several similar cases, what appeared on the surface to be
a straightforward and well constituted action turned into disaster
for the plaintiff when it subsequently turned out that, unbeknown
to him, the defendant had died shortly before the issue of the
writ . By holding an action against a dead person to be a'nullity,
and incapable of amendment, in all of these cases the courts
thwarted the plaintiffs' attempt to reconstitute their actions against
91 Discussed supra, text at footnotes 64 and 66 .
92 E.g ., in the cases relating to actions brought by sole proprietors in their
firm's name, supra, footnote 72 . Also the argument was successful, for
example, in the Ontario Court of Appeal, though not in the Supreme Court
of Canada, in Perpelytz, supra, footnote 85 .
93 [19691 1 O.R. 81, 1 D.L.R . (3d) 432 (H.C .) . Accord; Kulessa v.
Hefford, 11972] 1 O.R . 740 (C.A .) ; Dredge v . Greer, f1961] O.W.N . 185
(Master) ; C.P.R . Co . v. Pierce, [1928] 3 W.W.R. 585 (Alta S.C .) . See also
Gooderham v. Moore (1899), 31 O.R . 86 (H.C.) .
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the deceased person's estate . 94 Similar results have occurred where,
unknown to the solicitor issuing the writ, the plaintiff had died
prior to the commencement of the action.'15
In Mantle v. McIntyre" the situation was somewhat different .
There the plaintiff had the initial advantage of knowing that the
person who injured him was dead . But, unfortunately, the search
he had had made in the Surrogate Court Office to determine
whether letters probate or of administration had been granted
produced incorrect information . He was led to believe neither
had been granted, and so he applied to the court for the appoint-
ment of an administrator ad litern and commenced suit against
him . Subsequently, the truth was discovered : that the deceased's
executor, who knew full well of the plaintiff's claim, had earlier
taken out letters probate . To overcome the difficulty the plaintiff
applied to substitute the executor for the administrator ad litena,
alas, without success . There being an executor in existence, the
court order appointing the administator ad litena was held to be
void ab initio. Consequently, the plaintiff's action was a nullity and
the executor "could 'not be added as a defendant because you
cannot add something to nothing" . Similarly, it has been held
that to name "the Estate of" a deceased person, rather than his
administrator as defendant renders the proceedings a complete
nullity and incapable of amendment . 9, In one very recent case98
94 Now in Ontario (as in England) the legislature has stepped in and
specifically dealt with the problem, see The Trustee Act, R.S.O ., 1970,
c.470, s.38, as am . by 1971, c.32, s.2, empowering a judge to make an order
validating the writ . See also the Alberta legislation, infra, Appendix, item 3,
s.61 (c) and compare the Saskatchewan legislation, ibid., item 4.
05 In Rakha Rain v. Tinn (1911), 16 B.C.R . 317, 1 W.W.R . 35
(B.C .S.C.) the substitution of the deceased plaintiff's executor was per-
mitted . However, in Sleigh v. Coleman (1951), 1 W.W.R . (N.S .) 239
(B.C .S .C .) the court refused to follow this case and, applying two English
decisions, Clay v . Oxford (1866), L.R . 2 Ex . 54, and Tetlow v . Orela Ltd .,
[192012 Ch . 24, held the action to be a nullity and incapable of amendment.
Note that the curative Ontario and English legislations referred to in the
preceding footnote does not extend to actions brought in the name of
deceased persons.
911 [1965] 2 O.R . 130 (C.A .) .
0, Buteau v. Public Trustee, [1972] 2 W.W.R. 177, 24 D.L.R . (3d) 503
(Alta App. Div.), though this was only one of several blunders by the
plaintiff and it is likely that the requested amendment would have prejudiced
the defendant. But now, contrast Smith v . Estate of Oreille Peter Smith,
[1973] 3 O.R . (2d) 231 (H.C .) holding (without referring to Buteau)
that such a defect is a mere irregularity and amendable. While the actual
holding in Smith is a sound one, the reasoning relied upon by the court is,
with respect, highly conceptual and confused .
s8 Wallace v . Antoine, [1973] 6 W.W.R . 481 (B.C.C .C .) . In two other
recent cases the court rejected the defendant's argument that the proceed-
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a court has even held that merely to make the error of entitling
the proceedings "in the County Court of Duncan" where the
proper name is the "County Court of Nanaimo", renders the
proceedings an absolute nullity and incapable of amendment
even though the writ in the action was issued out of the County
Registry at Duncan which is where the County Court of, hlanaimo
sits .
Surely these decisions are, to use Singleton L.J .'s apt
description, "a blot on the administration of justice".19
Equally unjust in their result are a series of cases (brought
under the Fatal Accidents Act or Trustee Act and analogous
legislation)"") where the plaintiff has lacked the capacity of a per
sonal representative in which he purported to sue. In these cases
the courts have held that, if at the time he institutes the action the
plaintiff lacks the representative capacity, the proceedings are
a nullity and incapable of amendment"°1 notwithstanding that
ings were a nullity : Rempel v. Peterson, Howell, and Heather (Can .) Ltd.,
[1973] 4 W.W.R . 649, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 142 (B.C.C.A .) (Action brought in
wrong County. Court) ; Lesik v. Miller Cartage and-Contracting Ltd., [1972]
6 W.W.R. 385 (B.C.C.C .) (Inaccuraries in the text and caption of the
writ) .
ss Finnegan v. Cementation Co . Ltd., [1953] 1 Q.B . 688, at p. 699. While
the rules give the court express power to treat defects in proceedings as
irregularities and to grant leave to amend, see e.g ., Ont. Rules of Practice,
r. 186 (and also r. 185), and despite the general amendment principle (that
provided the other party will not be prejudiced, defective proceedings can
be cured '.iy amendment), the courts have constructed a category of defects,
called nullities, which are incapable of amendment : see Williston and Rolls,
op . cit., footnote 3, Vol. 1, pp . 496-509. It is submitted that this distinction
is basically unsound and one that is likely to, and in fact does, mislead the
court. In view of the mandate of Ont. r. 185 and similar rules directing the
court to grant amendments, the conclusion that a defect is incapable of
amendment (i .e . is a nullity) is one that, logically, should only be arrived
at after first confronting the issue of whether or not it would in the
circumstances be fair and reasonable, or prejudicial to the opposing party,
to permit an amendment. But the courts frequently refuse an amendment by
making an initial characterization that a defect is a nullity, without ever
asking the question whether it would be fair and reasonable and non-
prejudicial, to allow an amendment. Consequently, in the final analysis the
nullity-irregularity distinction is quite unhelpful and merely leads courts to
overlook the real issue: is this defect one which, in all circumstances,
should in fairness to the parties be amended? In the U.K . the rule makers
have directed that the nullity-irregularity distinction should be abandoned :
see, U .K ., Rules of the Supreme Court 1966, 0.2 . On the whole question
see Watson, Borins and Williams, op . cit., footnote 80, pp . 396-416.
See, e.g ., The Fatal Accidents Act, R.S .O ., 1970, c.164, and The
Trustee Act, .supra, footnote 94, s.38(1) .
I'll Last v. Ashworth (1946), 14 W.W.R . 279 (Alta App. Div.) ; Bod-
nat-irk v. C.P.R ., [1947] 1 W.W.R. 279 (Alta App. Div.) ; Public Trustee v.
Larsen (1964), 49 W.W.R . 416 (Alta App. Div.) ; Burlington v. G.T.P .
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(a) the plaintiff is in fact a member of the class of persons
intended to be benefited by the legislation, or (b) he subsequently
acquires'°'= the capacity alleged before trial and before the expiry
of the limitation period, and (c) irrespective of the fact that
the defendant would be in no way prejudiced by the amendment.
The principles developed by the Canadian courts in this area,
strongly influenced by English decisions,r°" have as their basis,
reasoning which is exclusively conceptual . The decisions are
Rlivy Co., [1923] 4 D.L.R . 334 (Sask. C.A .) ; McEllistruin v. Etches,
[1954] O.R . 814, [1954] 4 D.L.R . 350 (C.A .) but see, infra, as to the dis-
position of this case, on appeal, in the Supreme Court of Canada .
While the action under the Trustee Act is given only to the personal
representative, under the Fatal Accidents Act the action may be asserted
either by the personal representative or by the dependants of the deceased .
Consequently, in those cases where the plaintiffs, suing as personal repre-
sentative but lacking that capacity, were in fact dependants, they have
sought to save the action under the Fatal Accidents Act by striking out the
reference in the writ to administrative capacity . The courts' response to
such requests has turned on the particular wording of the writ . Where the
writ stated that the plaintiff sued "personally and as administrator" the
plaintiff has been permitted to amend and continue the action as a de-
pendant suing personally : McEllistrunt v. Etches, ibid., and infra . But
where the writ alleges only that the plaintiff sued "as administrator"
amendment has been refused on the ground that it would involve the setting
up of a new cause of action after the limitation period : Last v. Ashworth,
supra, ; Bodnaruk v. C.P.R ., supra.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in the McEllistruna case,
[1956] S.C.R . 787, 6 D.L.R . (2d) 1, the court managed in the circumstances
to rescue the whole of the plaintiff's action, but the reasoning used is narrow
in its scope and would not have helped the plaintiffs in the other cases. The
court expressly declined to pass on the correctness of the cases holding that
an action brought in an administrative capacity by someone who lacks the
capacity is a nullity . For the purposes of the case the court assumed, without
deciding, their correctness .
io'2A number of early Ontario cases had held that the subsequent acquisi-
tion of the capacity would relate back to save the action . In recent years,
however, Canadian courts have declined to follow these decisions, see
McEllistrum v. Etches, ibid . (Ont . C.A .) ; Burlington v. G.T.P . Rlwy Co .,
ibid.
103 E.g., Ingall v. Moran, [1944] K.B . 160 (C.A .) ; Hilton v. Sutton
Steam Laundry, [1946] K.B . 65 (C.A .) ; Finnegan v. Cementation Co . Ltd.,
supra. footnote 99 . By an amendment to the rules in 1965 the English law
on this subject has been changed, albeit slightly . Under Rules of the Su-
preme Court, 0.20, r. 5(3) (see infra, Appendix, item 2) the court may grant
an amendment changing the capacity in which the plaintiff sues (even after
the expiry of the limitation period) provided the capacity to be newly
alleged is one that the plaintiff possessed at the commencement of the
action. Stated shortly, the effect of this rule is that, in general, it will allow
proceedings under the Fatal Accidents Act to be saved but not proceedings
under the Trustee Act, This rule has also been adopted by the Federal
Court of Canada (General Orders and Rules, r. 426) and in Nova Scotia
(Civil Procedure Rules, r.15 .02) . Contrast the Alberta legislation, infra,,
Appendix, item 3, s.61(b) .
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unjust and, one would have thought, quite unnecessary. They
give no weight to the beneficient purpose of the legislation or to
the realities of the situation-that the defendant has been timely
informed of the plaintiff's claim and,will in no way be prejudiced
by the granting of an amendment or other requested relief .
111. A Functional Analysis of the Problem.
The foregoing review of the Canadian case law presents a mixed
picture. ®n the one hand it reveals that,, in many instances, the
manner in which the courts have dealt with the problem of
the post-limitation amendment of proceedings has been unsatis-
factory, and productive of great injustice. In this respect there
have been at least two basic difficulties underlying the courts'
handling of the issue over this century. Firstly, too often they have
failed to recognize that the problem is one that involves a direct
conflict between competing legal rules-the statute_ of limitations
and the power of amendment. Moreover they have been insensitive
to the fact that this conflict requires a, balancing: that it cannot
be satisfactorily resolved by giving blind preference to the statute
of limitations . Secondly, the courts have often fallen into the
trap of believing that the problem can be solved by the manipula-
tion of what are, in the final analysis, meaningless concepts (for
instance, that the .proceedings are a nullity) .
On the other hand the present day picture is, fortunately,
more promising. In recent years, by increasingly adopting a more
functional approach to the issue, the courts have substantially
reduced the incidence of injustice. Yet, even the modern cases
have never expressly taken the step which appears to be essential
to a resolution of these problems . It is, to attempt to fully under-
stand and articulate the purposes of the underlying and con-
flicting legal norms.
The proposition that legal rules can be understood only with reference
to the purposes they serve would today scarcely be regarded as an
exciting truth . The notion that law exists as a means to an end has
been common place for at least half a century . There is, however, no
justification for assuming, because this attitude has now achieved re-
spectability, and even triteness, that it enjoys a pervasive application in
practice. Certainly there are even today few legal treatises of which it
may be said that the author has throughout clearly defined the purposes
which his definitions and distinctions serve . We are still all too willing
to embrace .the conceit that it is possible to manipulate legal concepts
without the orientation which comes from the simple inquiry : toward
what end is this activity directed? 1Vietzche's observation, that the most
common stupidity consists in forgetting what one is trying to do,
retains a discomforting relevance to legal science? 04
104 Fuller 'and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
(1936) ; 46 Yale L.J . 52 .
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Faced with a problem involving a direct conflict between
competing legal rules an inquiry into the purposes sought to
be achieved by those rules becomes imperative . Such an inquiry
will likely point out both the need for a balancing of interests
and the possible balance that will produce a reasonable solution.
It is to this inquiry that we now turn .
A . The Purposes of the Procedural Devices Involved .
(i) Statutes of Limitations .
One leading text on the subject states that the purpose of
limitation periods is "that litigation shall be automatically stifled
after a fixed length of time, irrespective (for the most part) of
the merits of a particular case"."'-5 But in truth this is no more
than a statement of the effect of limitation periods . Such an
analysis is of little assistance when we are faced with the problem
of how to reconcile the prescription of a statute of limitations with
another competing principle of our law, that is, the broad power
of amendment . In such a context we need to know what are the
interests sought to be protected by such statutes . A rule which
cuts off actions at a specified time for no reason at all would
be senseless . Statutes of limitations are, of course, not such
rules . Rather they are based on sound reasons and have as their
object the attainment of important procedural and social objectives .
The primary consideration underlying such legislation is undoubtedly
one of fairness to the defendant. There comes a time when he ought
to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped
clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be called on to resist
a claim when "evidence has been lost, memories have faded and
witnesses have disappeared" . 111 6
The policies underlying such statutes are designed to safe-
guard the interests of the defendant in two ways . Firstly, they
seek to protect his interest in at some time being able to rely
on the fact that he no longer will have to preserve or seek out
evidence to defend claims against him . 1°7 Secondly, they grant
10 5 Franks, Limitation of Actions (1959), p. 4.
1°6 Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations (1950), 63 Harv .
L. Rev. 1177, at p. 1185 . A further reason, which would seem to be of less
consequence particularly in the content of amendment is the "protection of
courts from the burdens of state claims", James, Civil Procedure (1965),
p. 174. For general discussions of the purposes of statutes of limitations see
the Harvard Law Review article and James, supra, and also Note, op . cit .,
footnote 90, at pp. 84-85.
1 07- Note, ibid ., at p. 84 : "[Tjhe primary purpose of the statute is to
compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that a
defendant will have a fair opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.
Otherwise the belated institution of an actiton might prejudice defendant's
preparation of evidence."
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him protection "from insecurity, which may be economic or
psychological, or both";1°$ 'at some point in time he ought to
be made secure in his reasonable expectation that contingent
liabilities will no longer be asserted by legal action to disrupt his
finances and affect his business and social relations. 1-° 9
Since these are the interests of the defendant which the
limitation period seeks to protect, he should' be entitled to rely
on them after the period has run.
(ii) Pleadings and Amendments.
While pleadings perform a number of functions, 110 clearly
their most important purpose is to give the adversary fair notice
of the case alleged against him so that he will be able to prepare
his own. The purpose of the endorsement on the writ is similar,"'
though in cases where the writ is generally endorsed the type
of notice given will often be extremely general.
But in modern procedure the device of pleadings does not
stand in isolation. An integral and very important aspect of the
rules relating to pleadings, and the constitution and conduct
of a law suit generally, are the rules relating to amendment.
It was against the background of the formalism of common law
procedûre, whose limitation on the power of amendment caused
great injustices, that the procedural reformers of the nineteenth
century drew up our modern procedural code."'= The past
experience prompted them to give the court broad, powers, cast
in the form of a directive, to amend proceedings whenever this
appeared necessary to a. determination of the real issues . These
broad amendment powers are a central and essential feature
of modern procedure. Their purpose is primarily twofold. Firstly,
to permit `the correction of , non-prejudicial errors that occur
in the constituting or conduct of proceedings. Secondly, to permit
JOS James; op . cit ., footnote 106, p. 174.
109 "Second, the statute relieves the defendant from the otherwise endless
psychological fear of litigation based. upon events in the distant past." Note,
op . cit ., footnote 90, at p. 84 . Also "a limitations period avoids the dis-
ruptive effect of unsettled claims upon commercial intercourse . For ex-
ample, creditors may more accurately determine a person's financial status
if his former outstanding debts have been extinguished by the running of
the statute of limitations", ibid ., at p. 85 .
tto See, James, op . cit., footnote 106, pp . 54-61 .
111 See, Cairns v. Grigg, [1945] O.W.N . 497 (Master) .
112 Tidd's Practice (9th ed ., 1828), pp . 696-715 contains an extensive
discussion of the common law attitude to amendment: The practice was
considered liberalized by statute in the 19th century (and earlier), see,
Archbold, New Common Law Practice (1853), p. 268 et seq . ; Archbold's
Practice (13th ed ., 1879), Vol. 2, p. 1237 et seq.
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an action to be reshaped as it develops so that ultimately it
will be decided on the merits on the basis of the real issues
between the parties . 113
B . Matters Giving Rise to a Need for Balancing.
Given the purposes of the conflicting legal norms involved
therein, any satisfactory resolution of the problem of post-limitation
amendment per se requires a balancing of interests . But in the
contemporary context certain characteristics of modern day
litigation when coupled with the nature of the problem, reinforce
this need to strike a balance between the application of limitation
periods and the application of the power to amend proceedings .
First, while the broad amendment power vested in the court
signifies a rejection of procedural formalism, that is, of the notion
that harmless error may not be corrected, procedural formalism
has re-entered our system through the back door . A not insig-
nificant proportion of modern litigation is now governed by
very short limitation periods : one need only mention actions
arising out of highway traffic accidents,114 actions against
doctorsll-5 and public authorities, 116 and libel and slander, 117
and fatal accident proceedings."" In such actions, errors and
imperfections in the proceedings will often only be discovered
after the short limitation periods have expired . Yet the existing
body of case law has sometimes denied curative amendment of
even merely formal defects because the limitation period has
expired . As a result amendments have been refused which would
be granted without a second thought if the limitation period
had not expired .
The second characteristic of contemporary procedure which
is important in this context are the rules relating to discovery .
A major purpose of modern discovery is to avoid surprise at
the trial by aiding the pre-trial development of the case. It does
this by enabling a party to discover information which otherwise
113 In the present context it is important to note that the basic amend-
ment directive is sufficiently broadly framed so as to include corrections in
the naming of parties or the adding of parties, and is reinforced by a wide
rule specifically dealing with a change of parties .
114 E.g., The Highway Traffic Act, supra, footnote 37, s.146(1) (twelve
months) .
115 E.g., The Medical Act, R.S.O ., 1970, c.268, s .48 (one year) .
116 E.g., The Public Authorities Protection Act, R.S.O ., 1970, c.374, s .11
(six months) .
117 E.g., The Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O ., 1970, c.243, s .6 (three
months) .
118 E.g., The Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.O ., 1970, c.164, s .5 (twelve
months) .
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he might never know about'-"r' or learn of only at trial when it
is too late . Such information may relate -to a party's own case .
or that of his adversary. Not infrequently discovery will lead
a party to amend his pleadings: This is' a desirable state -of affairs,
for it maximizes the likelihood that the eventual trial will concern
itself with the real matters in issue and judgment will be given
"according to the very right and justice of the case". But in
actions which, are subject to a short limitation -period this desirable
objective may be thwarted . As statistics .indicate"-'° it is common
in cases governed by short limitation periods for discovery to
take place only after the limitation period. has expired. Hence,
when a plaintiff seeks to amend the proceedings to take into
account information obtained on discovery, leave may be refused
on the ground that time has run against him. In consequence,
much of the utility of modern discovery is lost in such cases.
To refuse to allow a case to be reshaped after discovery seems
quite unnecessary unless , the interests of the defendant sought
to be protected by the limitation period would actually be infringed
by the requested amendment.
Third, is the fact that generally the need to amend the
proceedings does not arise from any fault on the part of the
plaintiff personally . Usually the necessity for amendment can be
traced to the acts or omissions of the plaintiff's lawyer. Sometimes
the lawyer may have been negligent' 21 but often he will have
acted quite reasonably and with due care . (In these latter cases
the need to .amend may be .no one's fault and arises simply from
the imperfect nature of the world or of our litigation process.) "z2
But in reading the decided cases one is often left with the impres-
sion that the court has been callously blind to the fact that
the plaintiff's predicament is not of his own doing. Too frequently
courts have proceeded as if there were no' obligation' on their
part to see that the procedural system operates reasonably and
justly for individuals who have the misfortune to become
embroiled in it. This is surely an undesirable, and an unnecessary
""s Or which he would otherwise find out about only after . considerable
expenditure of time, effort and money.
"aa Professor Linden in The Report of the Osgoode Hall Study on Com-
pensation for the Victims of Automobile Accidents (19655 indicates that
in more than 6501o of automobile accident cases, discovery does not take
place until after the one year limitation period : see Ch. V, p. 19 .
"-'" E.g ., cases in which the plaintiff purports to sue in a specified capacity
but in fact lacks the capacity .'
"2= A good example are the cases where, unknown to the plaintiff's
lawyer, the defendant has died shortly before the issue of the writ . It has
been held that this does not involve negligence on the part of the lawyer .
Grima v. MacMillan, [1972] 3 O.R . 214.
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state of affairs . 23 Irrespective of the extent to which a party
should be bound by his lawyer's mistakes in other contexts, where
a post-limitation amendment is requested to overcome a lawyer's
error the court should strive to grant it to the extent that to
do so will not actually endanger the interests of the defendant
sought to be protected by the limitation period .
Finally, we need to appreciate the full significance of the
fact-present in all these cases-that an action has been timely
commenced by the plaintiff. This is significant for two reasons .
First, it demonstrates that the plaintiff is diligent and is concerned
with observing the limitation statute . Second, it always brings
into play the broad amendment power contained in the rules .
These two considerations should be kept in mind in determining
the manner in which the statute of limitations is applied . The fact
that such statutes are applied automatically in some contexts,
irrespective of the merits of a plaintiff's case or the reasons for
delay, is not necessarily a reason for making their automatic
operation universal . This is particularly so when the statute of
limitations comes into direct conflict with another legal rule-
the broad power of amendment.
C. A Suggested Approach to the Problem .
In light of the foregoing analysis and observations what
approach should the courts adopt to amendments after the
expiration of the limitation period? What principles can be
formulated to govern the resolution of such questions?
In exercising the amendment power the goal must be to strike
a balance between the, plaintiff's interest in fully developing the
action he has diligently commenced and the interests of the
defendant which the limitation period seeks to protect. As we
12.3 Contrast the attitudes now being taken, and clearly expressed, by
many courts in the context of the closely analogous issue of the post-
limitation renewal of a writ . See, e.g ., Simpson v. Sask . Govt . Iris . Office
(1968) . 65 D.L.R . (2d) 324, at p. 333, 61 W.W.R . 741 (Sask. C.A .) per
Culliton C.J .S. : "In an application to renew a writ of summons the basic
question which faces the Court is, what is necessary to see that justice is
done? That question must be answered after a careful study and review of
all the circumstances . If the refusal to renew the writ would do an obvious
and substantial injustice to the plaintiff, while to permit it is not going to
work any substantial injustice to the defendant or prejudice the defendant's
defence, then the writ should be renewed. This should be done even if the
only reason for non-service is the negligence, inattention or inaction of the
plaintiff's solicitors and notwithstanding that a limitation defence may have
accrued if a new writ was to be issued ." See also Estate of McDonald v .
Ellard (1973), 43 D.L.R . 581 (N .S .S .C . App. Div.) .
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have already seen the policies underlying statutes of limitations
seek to protect two interests of the defendant through the device
of timely notice of the plaintiff's claim. The first is that the
defendant need no longer preserve or seek out evidence to use
in defence of the claim. The second is that he need no longer
fear -the insecurity that his business and social activities will be
disrupted by the reactivation of claims which he reasonably
believes are dead . To the extent consistent with the protection
of these,interests the plaintiff should be entitled to freely amend
his action .
Hence, where a plaintiff seeks leave to amend after the
expiration of the limitation period, then (irrespective of whether
analytically it may involve the addition of a new cause of action,
a change of parties or the curing of a nullity) the amendment
should be, allowed whenever the defendant has received such
timely notice that he will not be prejudiced by an actual infringe-
ment of either of the interests sought to , , be protected by the
limitations statute. As to the "evidentiary- interest" the amend-
ment should only be refused when the defendant can show that
through lack of notice the change sought will require the use
of evidence now unavailable to him but which would have been
available had the action been constituted in this manner at the
outset. With regard to his ."interest in security" the amendment
should be permitted unless the defendant can show that through
lack of notice of the claim now sought to be asserted he actually
changed his position, to his detriment, in reasonable reliance
on the fact that the claim now sought to be asserted was dead .
It will be observed that, while giving a plaintiff broad
scope for amendment, two requirements are contained in this
suggested approach . The first is timely notice to the defendant.
Notice is the device by which the interests sought to be protected
by the statute of limitations are protected in the ordinary course
and this 'is retained . But here the concept of notice should not
be restricted merely to formal notice of the kind given by the
writ or the statement of claim. As many courts have already
done in the context of amendments after the limitation period,1_4
1=4 See, e.g., Can. Motor Sales Corp . Ltd. v. "The Madonna", supra,
footnote 24 in the cases cited supra, footnote 46- (correspondence) ; or
Ladouceur v. Howarth, supra, footnote 58 (negotiations) . In some circum-
stances the courts have been prepared to infer that the defendant had such
notice that he would not be prejudiced by the amendment, see the cases
cited, supra,, footnote 47 .
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and analogous situations,'-' :-, all sources of notice formal and
informal (for instance, correspondence or discovery) should be
taken into account.
The second requirement is that an amendment will not
be permitted if it can be shown that actual prejudice to the
defendant will result from his lack of timely notice . This require
ment assures that the legitimate interests of the defendant sought
to be protected by the statute of limitations remain inviolate-
but beyond this, amendments should be freely allowed. It is
also explicit in the above formulation that the burden of proving
the existence of actual prejudice should be placed on the defendant .
This seems reasonable and is in accord with the general principle
that where the facts necessary to establish a proposition are
peculiarly within the knowledge of one of the parties, that party
should bear the burden of proof.'-"6 If the amendment will cause
actual prejudice to the defendant, he is in the better position
to prove it . Generally, the plaintiff will not know whether the
defendant is prejudiced or not, and if the burden were placed
on him he will be faced with the difficulty of establishing a
negative proposition.
In Part IV below a proposed rule of practice embodying
the approach here suggested is put forward . By this, however,
it is not meant to suggest that the implementation of a change
in approach must await a reform of the rules.'= 7 Quite the contrary.
1_.i The problem of post-limitation renewal of an expired writ of sum-
mons is, in many respects, closely analogous to the problem discussed in
this article. (For a description of the courts' handling of the renewal prob-
lem see Watson, Borins and Williams, op . cit ., footnote 80, pp . 254-269) .
Many courts now take the position that they have a discretion to renew an
expired writ, notwithstanding the expiration of the limitation period : Ibid .
In exercising this discretion courts look at all the circumstances of the case,
but the most important factor appears to be whether or not the defendant
had notice, prior to the expiry of the writ, that the plaintiff was asserting a
claim against him : Ibid ., at p . 263 . Since in all these cases the basis of the
problem is that the writ has not been served within the appropriate time
period, any notice received by the defendant will be informal notice of
some kind . The courts have in this context considered various forms of
notice to be effective e .g., negotiations for settlement : Willson v. Fed.
Mutual Ins . Co ., [19621 O.W.N . 193 (H.C.) ; filing of proof of loss in
respect of an insurance claim : Simpson v. Sask . Govt Ins. Office, supra,
footnote 123 .
1=s Cross, Evidence (3rd ed ., 1967), pp . 79-80 ; McCormick, Evidence
(2nd ed ., 1972), p . 287 ; Cleary, Presuming and Pleading : An Essay in
Juristic Immaturity (1959), 12 Stan . L . Rev. 5, at pp . 11-14 .
127 However, it should be noted that a full judicial implementation of the
approach here suggested may be difficult at one point-with regard to the
addition or substitution of defendants-without some change in the rules .
This is because the rules often provide that "the proceedings as against (an
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The case for its application . by the judiciary, without awaiting
legislative intervention, is a strong one. In origin the rule was
judicially created in Weldon v. Neal. Subsequently it has been
extended, judicially, into many areas in which functionally it
makes little sense and creates injustice . On the other hand of late
we see many courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada,
moving in the direction here suggested. 1228 In this sense the
adoption of this approach would be in keeping with the general
trend of modern decisions rather than a break with it. Also, it
should be noticed, as some courts have recently come to recognize
and develop, 120 that the original formulation of the rule in
Weldon v. Neal itself specifically provided for exceptions . More-
over, it can be forcefully argued that the approach here advocated
is consistent with the existing rules of court, when closely and
reasonably read. After all the basic amendment rule does direct
that :
A proceeding shall not be defeated by any formal objection, but all
necessary amendments shall be made . . . to secure the advancement
of justice, the determining of the real issues in dispute, and the giving
of judgment according to the very right and justice of the case .130
The approach outlined here will do nothing more than implement
this mandate. Indeed one cannot help but speculate that in
adopting this approach the courts would be doing just what the
original drafters of the rule intended . It seems highly debatable
that they ever intended the glosses that have been placed on
this rule by much of the progeny of Weldon v. Neal .
IV. A Proposed Model Rule on Amendment After
the Rxpiry of the Limitation Perod.
By using the approach outlined above it is believed that the courts
themselves could go a long way, towards -adequately and justly
dealing with the range of problems presented by requests for
post-limitation amendments . However, it is preferable that . a new
rule be passed dealing expressly with the subject. At the very
minimum such a new rule is more likely to ensure a change
added or substituted defendant) shall be deemed to have begun only at the
time when they are added", see, e.g ., Ont. Rules of Practice, r. 136(3) . While
this provision, apparently, caused the court no difficulty in Chretien v.
Herrman, supra, footnote 62 (a case of substitution after a misnomer) it
has led to the refusal of an amendment in other situations, see, e.g ., Greig
v. Toronto Trans. Comm ., supra, footnote 81 .
l'-'s See, supra, text at footnote 20 and footnote 64 et seq. See also Cooney
v. Ottawa-Carleton Reg. Transit Comm., [1974] 5 O.R . (2d) 92 (H.C .),
and also Roe v. F. A . Buskard and Son, Ltd., supra, footnote 26 .
1_s See the discussion, supra, at footnotes 8 and 20.
130 Ont. Rules of Practice, r. 185 (emphasis added) .
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of attitude, where necessary, and to produce a consistent approach
to the problem by the courts . What form should a new rule take?
Various models exist since rules or legislation on the subject
have been enacted in the United States, Alberta, Saskatchewan,
England, Nova Scotia and the Federal Court of Canada."'
While on reflection all but one of these provisions appear
to be inappropriate as models in drafting a legislative solution
to the problem, the others are useful in pointing out approaches
to be avoided.
It seems desirable that a rule on the subject should avoid
either one of two extremes . At one end of the spectrum is the
approach (illustrated by the Alberta legislation and the English
-Nova Scotia-Federal Court of Canada rule) which, while
retaining the general prohibition against post-limitation amend-
ment, provides that amendment may be granted in specified
circumstances, notwithstanding the expiry of the limitation period :
the specified circumstances in which amendment is allowed being
based upon certain "types" of situation which have caused
difficulty in the past (for instance, misnomers, cases involving
dead persons, and so on) . Such an approach is too narrow since
it gives the court no scope to adequately deal with new situations
as they arise""' and thus to do justice in all cases. It may even
tie the courts' hands, as would appear to be the situation in
England,'" and arrest their own development of a more
enlightened solution to the problem.
i" See Appendix for the text of these provisions . The English, Nova
Scotia and the Federal Court of Canada rules are virtually identical. Also
included in the Appendix is the recommendation made in 1969 by the
Ontario Law Reform Commission . It should be noted that the U .S . Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure on the subject, r. 15(c) (see Appendix, item 1)
has been adopted by, or influenced the legislation, in many states of the
U.S.A.
isz The Alberta legislation, infra, Appendix, item 3, illustrates this point.
That legislation deals only with amendments changing the parties and con-
cerns itself merely with three types of situations that have caused difficulty
in the past, i .e . mistakes as to the owner of a motor vehicle, lack of capacity
and suing a dead defendant. By adopting this narrow approach the legisla-
tion failed to provide the Alberta courts with the tools to deal easily or
adequately or both with such cases as Basarsky v . Quinlan, supra, footnote
S (alleged change in the cause of action) or Buteau v . Public Trustee, supra,
footnote 97 (an action against "the Estate of" a named deceased)-both
cases arising subsequently to the passage of the Alberta legislation . The U.K.,
Nova Scotia, Federal Court of Canada rules, infra, Appendix, item 2,
while more comprehensive in approach than the Alberta legislation, also
suffer from over-concern with situations already encountered in the case
law: see next footnote .
133 See, e.g ., Braniff v . Holland and Hannon and Cubitts (Southern) Ltd .,
[19691 3 All E.R . 959 (C.A .) . In England there has been a sharp division
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At the other end of the spëctrum is the extremely general
rule (illustrated by the Saskatchewan legislation) simply giving
the court an unfettered discretion to grant an amendment despite
the passage of the, limitation period .134 The danger with this
type of rule is that in failing to give the court any direction as
to how the power is to be exercised, either of two consequences
may result . It may lead courts to be unnecessarily restrictive in
refusing leave to amend, or it may lead them to grant amendments
which it was never intended should be permitted since they would
be unjust to the defendant. In this latter regard A must be kept
in mind that if limitation periods are to serve their intended
purposes then defendants should be given,, in advance, some
meaningful indication of the limits of the amendment power.
Otherwise we might find ourselves in a situation where the
new amendment power abrogates the statute of limitations itself.
A model rule, then, should on the one hand avoid simply
dealing with previously identified types of situation. On 'the
other hand it should give the court, and defendants, guidance
as to how the amendment power is to be exercised, while ensuring
that the court has the necessary scope to deal with new situations
as they arise- and to do justice in all cases.
In formulating a model rule it will be convenient to deal
separately with amendments changing the plaintiff's . claim and
those involving a change of parties.
of opinion as to the scope and effect of the new English rule . Lord
Denning has taken the view that, since the passage of the new rule, the
Weldon v. Neal principle should be discarded and amendments allowed
whenever it appears just to do so, notwithstanding the expiry of the limita-
tion period : Chatsworth Investment Ltd. v. Cussins (Contractors) Ltd.,
[1969] 1 All E.R . 143, at p. 145 ; Sterman v. E.W . and W.J. Moore Ltd.,
[1970] 1 All E.R . 581, at p. 585. This view has received support from
Salmond L.J . (see Sternnan, supra) and from Sachs L.J . (see Brickfield
Properties Ltd. v. Newton, [1971] 3 All E.R . 328, at p.. 338) . But other
members of the Court of Appeal, relying on a literal reading of the rule,
have taken the position that the Weldon v. Neal principle remains in force,
and that the rule simply allows amendments to be granted in certain,
narrowly specified circumstances ; see, e .g ., Edmund Davies and Cross L.J .J .
in Brickfield Properties Ltd., supra; Widgery L.J . in Braniff, supra. In the
Federal Court of Canada, Collier J. in Can. Motor Sales Corp . Ltd. v.
"The Madonna", supra, footnote 24, preferred the view of Lord Denning
as to the effect of the new rule . See also the discussion in B.C . Airlines
Ltd. v. The Queen, supra, footnote 80 .
134 The Saskatchewan legislation gives the court an unlimited discretion
with regard to amendments changing the-cause of action . Note, however,
that it imposes severe-restrictions on amendments changing the parties . The
provision recommended by the Ontario Law Reform Commission, see
infra, Appendix, item 5, would give the court a general power without
direction as to how it is to be exercised.
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A. Amendments Changing The Plaintiff's Claim.
On this aspect of the subject the United States Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provide a satisfactory model on which to
build. The English rule (now also adopted in Nova Scotia and
by the Federal Court of Canada) while similar to the United
States rule, is less happily worded.'", At the other extreme, the
power given by Saskatchewan legislation'"" is so broad as to give
no direction to 'the courts, or warning to the defendant.
The United States Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)
provides that an amendment will be permitted, notwithstanding
the expiry of the limitation period, whenever the new claim,
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleadings . . . .137
In policy terms this seems a sound approach to the problem.
After the passage of the rule, the defendant must realize that
once an action is commenced the plaintiff is entitled to amend to
include any claim arising out of the underlying conduct, trans-
action or occurrence, and so on, and that he should treat all
claims arising out of these as still potentially contingent, not
dead.13 3 In so doing, it is to be noted that the rule represents
135 The text of these rules is set out in the Appendix, item 2, Under these
rules amendment may be granted if the new claim "arises out of the same
facts or substantially the same facts" as the original claim. By contrast
under the U.S . rule the operative phrase is that the claim arose out of the
same "conduct, transaction or occurrence" . While the former rules have to
date received a reasonably broad interpretation see, e.g ., the Brickfield
Properties case, supra, footnote 133, the wording of the U .S . rule is, it is
submitted, desirably broader in intent and less susceptible to a narrow
interpretation . See the discussion, infra, footnote 141 and cf . Goodman,
Problems of Limitation (1969), 119 New L.J. 814, at p. 815 suggesting
that the Alai-shall and Batting cases, discussed infra, footnote 141, would
still be decided the same way under the English rule . The editors of The
Supreme Court Practice (1970), believe these two cases "may [now) be
decided differently" but that Weldon v. Neal itself would still be decided
the same way under the English Rule : at pp . 20/5-8/13.
136 See Appendix, item 4, and text at footnote 134, supra . The same
criticism applies to the Ontario Law Reform Commissions proposal, see
footnote 134, supra . The Alberta legislation, Appendix, item 3, contains no
provision dealing with a change in the cause of action .
137 The full text of r. 15(c) is set out in the Appendix, item 1 . This rule
uses the terminology, in general use in the United States in the context of
post-limitation amendment, of amendments "relating-back to the date of the
original pleading" . This difference from the Canadian-English practice is
one merely of terminology and not of substance. See footnote 174, infra .
1,98 The consistency of this approach with the policies underlying limita-
tion periods is eloquently described in James, op . cit ., footnote 106, pp,
174-175.
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an advance ,over the "common law" functional approach developed
above. 1t does away, at least, initially, with the need for an
inquiry as to whether the defendant received actual, notice of
the new claim sought to be added,139 since, by the rule itself
all defendants are notified in advance that, if necessary, all
aspects of the underlying occurrence may be fully litigated not-
withstanding the passage of the limitation period . 1.41, This gives
the plaintiff scope for amendment which will permit him to
fully' develop all aspects of the action he has timely commenced.
The limits of the rule, are that the plaintiff may not add claims
which- are unrelated to his original claim; that is those which
do not arise out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence .141
This limitation represents an eminently reasonable balancing of
the interests involved . 14a
139 A similar approach is already apparent in some of the decided cases
in Canada, e.g ., the recent decision in Cooney v. Ottawa-Carletoit Beg.
Transit Comm., supra, footnote 128.
140 "Limitation is suspended by the filing of a suit because the suit warns
the defendant to collect and preserve his evidence in reference to it . When
a suit is filed in a federal court under the Rules, the defendant knows that
the whole transaction described in it will be fully sifted, by amendment if
need be, and that the form of the action or the relief prayed or the law
relied on will not be confined to their first statement." Barthel v. Stamm
(1944), 145 F. 2d 487, 491, cert . den. 324 U.S. 878 (C.A . 5th Cir.) . But
in borderline cases, particularly those presenting difficult questions of
characterization as to whether the new claim does arise out of some
transaction or occurrence, it will be of assistance to ask whether the
defendant had such notice of the claim that he .will not be prejudiced bb
the requested amendment.
141 However, it is important to note that the test embodied in the rule is
a considerably broader one than that which has been applied to date in
several cases, in determining whether an amendment states a "new cause
of action" (a phrase which has been deliberately avoided in formulating a
new rule) . A number of cases, mostly following Batting v. L.P.T .B .,
[1941] 1 All E.R . 228 (C.A .) and Marshall v. L.P.T.B.,[1936] 3 AllE.R . 83
(damage action for negligent driving of a tram-no amendment allowed to
allege breach of statutory duty to maintain tramlines and adjoining road as
cause of injuries) have held that a new cause of action is stated, and thus
amendment should be refused, where the amended, claim involves "quite
new considerations, quite new sets of facts, and quite new causes of damage
and injury" (Ibid ., at p. 88) : see, e.g ., Kiselewsky, supra, footnote 18
(change in theory as to cause of the accident) ; City Construction, supra,
footnote 15, (change from negligence to contract as the theory of recovery);
Weston, supra, footnote 18 ; but contrast Cooney, supra, footnote 128. Under
the model rule here proposed, amendment would be granted in such cases,
notwithstanding that new considerations, facts, etc., are involved because in
each case the new claim arose out of the same conduct, transaction or
occurrence. It is likely that under the model rule all of the cases -cited supra,
footnotes 12 to 31, refusing amendment, would be decided differently .
142 See the analysis referred to supra, footnote 138.
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Adopting the model of the United States Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, with certain modifications necessitated by
differences in Canadian practice, the proposed rule reads as
follows
Rule XXX Amendments to Proceedings After the Expiration
of the Limimtion Period .
(a) Amendments Changing the Claims Asserted .
The court may allow an amendment changing the claims asserted in an
action, notwithstanding that since the commencement of the action a
relevant limitation period has expired, whenever the claim sought to be
added by amendment arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading or writ .
The application of the rule calls for little comment beyond
what has already been written . In practice it should prove to
be relatively easy to apply . By deliberately avoiding any reference
to "cause of action" the proposed rule obviates the need to
struggle with what is in this context the difficult, imprecise and
highly conceptual inquiry as to whether or not a new cause
of action is stated by the amendment . 143 Instead, the relevant
question is the more manageable one of whether the new matter
asserted by the amendment arose out of the conduct, transaction
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading or writ . Interpreted with constant attention
to its benevolent purpose the rule can deal justly with any request
by plaintiffs to amend their claims after the running of the
limitation period.'{' Although the rule states that the amend-
ments there described "may be granted", the intention is that,
prima facie, all such amendments shall be granted . The court
should only exercise its discretion, within the rule to refuse leave
143 A profuse U.S . literature, dating from the 1920's and 30's, as to the
true meaning of the term "cause of action" points up graphically the desir-
ability of avoiding the use of the term in procedural rules: see, e.g ., Clark,
The Code Cause of Action (1924), 33 Yale L.J . 817; McCaskill, Actions
and Causes of Action (1925), 34 Yale L.J . 614; Harris, What is a
Cause of Action? (1928), 16 Calif . L. Rev. 459 ; Gavit, The Code Cause of
Action : Joinder and Counterclaims (1930), 30 Col. L. Rev. 802; Thurman
Arnold, The Code "Cause of Action" Clarified by the United States Supreme
Court (1933), 19 A.B.A .J . 215; Gavit, A "Pragmatic Definition" of the
"Cause of Action" (1933), 82 U. of Pa . L. Rev. 129; Clark, The Cause
of Action, ibid., at p. 354; Gavit, The Cause of Action-A Reply, ibid ., at
p. 695. The U .S . Federal Rules now deliberately avoid the use of the term
"cause of action", see James, op . cit ., footnote 106, pp . 76, 446 et seq, and
instead generally use the "transaction or occurrence" standard: cf . Ont.
Rules of Practice, rs 66 and 67 .
144 In addition a considerable body of United States case law exists to
assist and guide the courts . See generally Wright and Miller, op . cit ., foot-
note 10, p. 482 et seq . ; Moore, Federal Practice (1969), Rule 15(c).
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to amend, where the amendment will prejudice the defendant in
some way that is unconnected with the expiry of the limitation
period, or will defeat the actual interests of the defendant sought
to be protected by the limitation period.145
B. . Amendments Changing the Parties to the Action .
On the subject of amendments involving a change of parties,
or their capacity, none of the existing rules- or- legislation seems
entirely satisfactory as a model. -Again, however, the United
States Federal Rule 15(c) provides a suitable basis on which
to build.
The English rules, now also 'adopted by the Federal Court
of Canada and in Nova Scotia,14c are simply too restrictive. They
attempt to deal with the subject through two provisions : one
dealing with change of capacity, the other with the correction
of mistakes in the naming of a party. The provision concerning
alteration of the capacity in which a party sues'
,
47 only permits
an amendment if he enjoyed the capacity, in which he now
wishes to sue, at the date the writ was issued .148 Since there
is no justification in functional terms for such a restriction it
would be unwise to adopt this provision as a cure for problems
of change of capacity. Indeed, a rule in this form would, still
lead to a refusal of leave to amend to alter capacity in certain
cases where it would clearly be just to permit amendment.14s
14', E.g .,, if the defendant can show that the change in the plaintiff's case
will, through lack of timely notice, require him to use evidence now unavail-
able to him. However, such cases will be rare because the rule itself notifies
the defendant that, in effect, he should retain all evidence relating to any
claim arising out of the underlying transaction or occurrence.
146 See Appendix, item 2. The approach of the Alberta legislation (see
Appendix, item 3) is too narrow, simply providing for amendment in three
specific types of situations-mistake as to the owner of a motor vehicle,
lack of capacity, and actions against dead persons : see the discussion, supra,,
footnote 132. The Saskatchewan legislation (see Appendix, item 4) appears
to be primarily concerned with amendments changing the cause of action
and not with changes as to parties . The Ontario Law Reform Commission
proposal (see Appendix, item 5) would clearly permit a change of parties
but uses language which is so broad as to give the- court no direction as to
when and how to exercise the power : see the discussion supra, footnote 134.
14 U.K ., Rules of Supreme Court 1965, 0.20, r. 5(4), see Appendix,
item 2.
148 See, The Supreme Court Practice (1970), pp. 318-319; Goodman,
op . cit ., footnote 135, at p. 815.
14 "3 In particular in cases where administrative capacity, while essential,
is not possessed by the plaintiff at the date the writ is issued but is subse-
quently acquired, e.g., actions under the Trustee Act: see footnotes 101 and
102 supra.
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The English provision' ,'-10 dealing with the correction of
mistakes in the naming of a party is likewise too narrow in
scope to allow justice to be done in all cases. The wording
used is likely to lead to restrictive interpretations . For instance,
the use of the term "substitution" would likely lead to the
conclusion that the court has no power to add an additional
party to the proceedings, as was done in Accaputo v. Sitna-
novskislr" where a husband was added to his wife's action to
permit recovery of special damages. Moreover, the reference
to "genuine mistake" that is "not misleading or such as to cause
any reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person intending
to sue or, as the case may be, intended to be sued" is all too
likely (as was probably the drafters' intention) to lead to an
interpretation restricting the rule to the mere correction of mis-
nomers . Indeed this has already occurred in one English easel-52
holding that the rule did not permit an amendment to add the
executor where the plaintiff had unwittingly sued a dead defendant .
So interpreted this rule would not permit amendment in a variety
of circumstances, which have already arisen in Canada, and where
it would seem clearly just to do so : for instance, cases holding
the proceedings to be a nullity,';,3 and cases where it could be
said that there is a reasonable doubt as to the identity of the
person intending to sue or be sued, but where such doubt would
not cause actual prejudice to the defendant .154
The foregoing observations suggest that a rule concerned
with change of parties, if it is to permit justice to be done in all
the various situations that can arise, should have a minimum of
criteria and these should be broad and functional . Criteria con-
cerned with past events (for instance, mistake, absence of
reasonable doubt as to identity) should be avoided or kept to
a minimum. Instead emphasis should be placed on timely notice
to the defendant and on whether, in the circumstances, he will
be actually prejudiced by the amendment.
In this regard the approach of the United States Federal
Rule 15(c) is preferable . The rule (which, however, deals only
150U.K ., Rules of Supreme Court 1965, 0.20, r . 5(3), see Appendix,
item 2 .
151 Supra, footnote 73 . See also Curran v. Rudyk, supra, footnote 76 .
15'Dawson (Bradford) Ltd. v. Dove, [1971] 2 W.L.R. 1 (Q.B .) . See also
Braniff v. Holland and Hannen and Cubitts, supra, footnote 133 .
153 See, e .g ., the Kaltenback and Robinson cases, supra, footnote 72,
involving actions by a sole proprietor brought in the firm name, Mantle v.
McIntyre, supra, footnote 96, and generally the cases discussed supra, in
Part II B (iii) .
15-1 See, e.g., Western Freight Lines, supra, footnote 23 ; McPhee v.
Ahern, supra, footnote 58 ; Accaputo v.. Simanovskis, supra, footnote 73 .
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with changes of defendants) 15 -5 has as its major requirement
that the defendant should have "`received such notice of the
institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintain-
ing his defense 'on the merits" . 15c The proposed rule, modelled
after Federal Rule 15(c), but with a number of modifications,
is as follows :
(b) Amendments Adding or Substituting a Plaintiff .
The court may allow an amendment adding or substituting a plaintiff,
or,changing the capacity in which a plaintiff sues, notwithstanding that
since the commencement of the action a relevant limitation has expired,
if
(i)	the claim to be asserted by the new plaintiff, or by the original
plaintiff in his new capacity, arose out of the conduct transaction
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the action
as originally constituted, and
(ii) the defendant has, within the limitation period plus the period
provided by law for the service of process, received such formal
or informal notice that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining
his defence on the merits, and
(iii) the court is satisfied that the addition or substitution of the new
plaintiff is, necessary or desirable to ensure,the effective enforce-
ment of the claims originally asserted or intended to be asserted
in the action .
(c) Amendments Adding or Substituting a ,Defendant.
The court may allow an, amendment adding or substituting a defendant,
or changing the capacity in which a defendant is sued, notwithstanding
that since the commencement of the action a relevant limitation period
has expired, if
(i)	the claim to be asserted against the new defendant, or against the
the original defendant in his new capacity, arose out of the conduct,
transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the action as originally constituted, 'and
(ii) the party to be brought in by amendment has, within the limitation
period plus the period provided by law for the service of process,
received such formal or informal notice that he will not be prej-
udiced in maintaining his defence on the, merits .
The aim of the proposed . sub-rules is to give a plaintiff, who has
demonstrated his diligence by commencing his action within the
hü For the other requiremènts under this rule see the text of the rule
while r. 15(c) does not expressly deal with amendments changing plaintiffs,
the principles contained in the rule apply by analogy to such cases see,
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule, of Civil Procedure 15(c)
(1966), 39 Fed. Rules Dec . 82 .
156 But the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules has indicated that,
infra, Appendix, item 1 . The working of the present r . 15(c) in respect of
a change of parties (which is the product of an amendment made in 1966)
has given rise to a number of problems of interpretation . These are fully
discussed in Note, op. cit., footnote 90 .
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limitation period, the fullest scope to amend the proceedings as
to parties that is consistent with the upholding of the interests
of the defendant sought to be protected by the statute of
limitations . The rules proceed on the basis, justified earlier in
Part 111, that generally it is reasonable to allow an amendment
changing the parties or their capacity whenever the defendant,
or person sought to be added as defendant, has received such
timely notice that he will suffer no actual prejudice in being
called upon to defend the action as amended .
Before turning to an elaboration of the requirements of
these proposed rules, something more must be said by way of
justification of them . In view of the position taken in the rules
as to when an amendment changing parties will or will not be
allowed, two questions obviously arise and need to be answered .
The first question is concerned with the fact that the model
rule destroys the universal approach presently adopted with
regard to the operation of limitation periods . As a consequence
of the proposed rule, D (a potential defendant) will now be
treated differently depending on whether the plaintiff has (a)
failed to sue anyone within the limitation period, or (b) he has
sued someone other than D. Thus the proposed rule destroys
the unity of my approach to the operation of limitation periods,
since it remains true that the plaintiff-if he has sued no one within
the limitation period-cannot escape the bar of the statute
and sue D, simply by showing that D had notice of his claim
and will not be prejudiced in having to defend against it. How
can this state of affairs-the different treatment of D in the two
situations-be justified? Why not deal with the problem at a more
basic level by a general legislative provision empowering the
court to relax the bar of the limitation period in all circumstances
(whether they be cases of non-commencement or of amendment
to a timely commenced action) where the purpose of the statute
of limitations has been satisfied, that is, whenever the defendant
has received such notice that he will not be prejudiced in having
to defend? The response to this question is twofold . Firstly, my
concern here is with the plight of the diligent plaintiff who has
timely commenced his action and, invoking the amendment power,
seeks the aid of the court in fully developing, stating and
enforcing that action . As a general matter this is a situation
calling for much greater concern than that of the plaintiff who
has never commenced an action within time. Secondly, in situations
where no action has been commenced at all within the limitation
period there is much to be said for the automatic operation of
limitation periods : the clear objective rule governing such cases
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encourages diligence on the part of litigants and, particularly,
lawyers. Put the other way round, a relaxation of the automatic
operation of limitation periods in the non-commencement cases
may lead to an unacceptable change in diligence in commencing
actions. ®f course, this implies no criticism of recent beneficial
legislation permitting the post-limitation commencement of an
açtion where the plaintiff has been ignorant within the limitation
period of the fact that he had a cause of action .157
The second question is : why choose cases where there is
notice and a lack of prejudice to the defendant as the only cases
in which a post-limitation amendment changing the parties should
be permitted? Why not a narrower . rule, or a broader one,, for
instance, allowing an amendment in all cases where the defendant
cannot show prejudice, irrespective of whether or not he had
notice? Enough has already been said as to why a narrower rule
should not be adopted. Justifying the rejection of the broader
test is, perhaps, more difficult. But it is important to recognize
that, once it is decided to relax the strict approach in relation
to postlimitation amendments, no watertight logic indicates just
where the line should be drawn. In the final analysis that must
be a policy decision. ®n balance it seems reasonable (certainly
until a more `general relaxation of the rigorous - and automatic
operation of limitation periods is instituted) to allow post-limita-
tion amendments only where the interests of the defendant sought
to be protected by the statute of limitations are protected in the
same way the statute protects them, that is, through notice .
Moreover, retaining notice as a requirement (rather than
abandoning it in favour of a simple "lack of prejudice to the
defendant" test) has the advantage of giving structure to the
inquiry as to whether amendment should be allowed, and may
produce fairer results than the broader alternative . If the. defendant
can be shown to have had timely -notice it can safely be presumed
that, prima facie, there will be a lack of prejudice and place
the burden on him to show otherwise. This is not the case where
he has had no notice of the claim. He may or may not be
prejudiced in such circumstances but it will frequently be dif-
ficult to establish this one way or the other.
J shall now, turn to an elaboration of the requirements
of the model rule as to change of parties and a discussion of
their intended application.
157 See, e.g., Limitation Act (U.K.), 1963, c. 47, and The -Linlitation of
Actions .Act, R.S.M., - 1970, c. L150, s.15 . --,
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(i) Requirement that the Amendment Relate to the Same
Conduct, Transaction or Occurrence as Originally Relied On.
Under each of the two sub-rules the first requirement is
that the claims to be asserted by the new plaintiff, or against a
new defendant, must be ones that arose out of the same conduct,
transaction or occurrence relied upon in the action as originally
constituted. This requirement, which is to be found in United
States Federal Rule 15(c), is a straightforward and rather obvious
one. It ensures that any amendment changing the parties also
satisfies sub-rule (a), and does not alter the basic subject matter
of the litigation . The model rule is designed to assist a plaintiff,
who has timely commenced an action in respect of a particular
transaction or occurrence, in perfecting that action . However,
the rule is not intended to enable such a plaintiff to convert his
action by amendment into one relating to a different transaction
when a new action in respect of the latter transaction would be
statute barred .
(ii) Requirement of Timely Notice and Lack of Prejudice.
As already indicated the basic and most important require-
ment of both the sub-rules permitting a change of parties is that
the new or old defendant, as -the case may be, have received such
timely notice that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his
defence on the merits to the action as amended. Several aspects
of this composite requirement call for comment.
a. Nature of the "Notice" Required .
The United States Federal Rule specifically requires notice
of the "institution of the action" . This requirement has led some
American courts to hold that before a new defendant may be
added it must be shown that he had actual notice of the com-
mencement of the action .15 s But notice short of actual notice
of the institution of the action may, in many circumstances, be
quite sufficient to avoid prejudice to the new defendant (for
instance, where he has received informal notice that the plaintiff
is asserting a claim against him through negotiations aimed at
settling the claim) . Consequently, the model rule avoids any
such term as "notice of the institution of the action". Moreover,
the rule intentionally refrains from specifying the nature of the
required notice apart from indicating that it may be formal or
15sE .g., Craig v. U.S . (1969), 413 F . 2d 854 (9th Cir .) and other cases
cited in Wright and Miller, op . cit ., footnote 10, p . 1498, and Note, op . cit.,
footnote 90, at pp. 97-98 . But the decisions on this point are far from
unanimous and other courts have held notice short of actual notice of the
commencement of the action to be sufficient.
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informal and that it must be such that the defendant will not .
be prejudiced in defending on the merits .- It is felt that, beyond
this, what is sufficient notice is best left to be determined by the
court, within the framework of the policy of the rule and its
specific requirements, in the circumstances of each individual case .
It is very difficult, and probably impossible, to prescribe in
advance for all cases what will or will not be adequate notice
to insure that the defendant will not be prejudiced in having
to defend .
In practice, in most cases where a change -of- parties is re-
quested notice will present little problem and will frequently
amount to notice of the commencement of the action . For instance,
those cases where an amendment is sought requesting a change of
plaintiff are typically ones where the claims -asserted against the
defendant remain the same as for instance, in. Western Freight
Lines159 and the married women's special damage cases.16o Here
the notice given the defendant by the action as originally constituted
will be .sufficient to avoid any prejudice to the defendant. In situa-
tions -where the new plaintiff asserts a different claim to that
alleged by the original plaintiff as in Ladouceur, 161 notice beyond
that given by the action as originally constituted may be-necessary
to avoid prejudice to the defendant, and may be supplied by in-
formal notice of the plaintiff's claim conveyed through settlement
negotiations .
Similarly, in the majority of commonly encountered situations
where a plaintiff seeks to add a new defendant, notice should
present little problem. In the true misnomer situation-where the
plaintiff intended to sue X but has misdescribed him-the party
intended to be sued (and "added") has usually been served, is
before the court and will have clear notice of the claim. Even in
cases where the plaintiff intended to sue only X (and not Y), but
now seeks to add or substitute Y as a defendant, sufficient notice to
Y may be present. Here the courts can and should make use of
rebuttable presumptions to aid in the resolution of the notice issue.
In certain situations (generally referred to as "estoppel" cases in
the United States), 162 the plaintiff will have wrongly named X
rather than Y as a defendant as a result of having been given
wrong information or having been misled as in Chretien 163 and
Gaytee164 . In such cases there will frequently be a substantial
159 Supra, footnote 23 .
1610 Supra, text at footnote 75 .
161 Supra, footnote 58 .
162 See Wright and Miller, op .
163 Supra, footnote 62.
164 Supra, footnote 8 .
cit,, footnote 10, § 1500.
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personal or business relationship between X and Y. Where this is
so it would be reasonable for the courts to employ a rebuttable
presumption that the new defendant, Y, has received sufficient
notice.165 In other situations (referred to in the United States as
"identity of interest" cases166) the plaintiff will have named X
rather than Y as defendant where X and Y are closely related
business entities, for instance, where X and Y are a parent com-
pany and a wholly owned subsidiary, or related corporations with
common directors, or the past and present form of some enterprise
which has undergone merger or amalgamation . Here again the
court should make use of a rebuttable presumption that notice to
X in fact brought notice of the action to the attention of Y.
It is chiefly in situations where the new defendant has had
no prior direct relations with either the plaintiff or the original
defendant that notice will present a significant problem. In such
cases if the new defendant is genuinely a stranger to the litigation
and ignorant of it (as might well occur in situations where a
personal injury plaintiff failed to initially join the actual manufac-
turer of his car tires, or the seller in an action against the car
manufacturer167 ), the notice requirement is unsatisfied and the
amendment will be refused. However, in all cases if the new
defendant had received some timely notice of the proceedings, or
of the plaintiff's claim, the court must decide whether in the cir-
cumstances the notice is sufficient to ensure that the defendant will
not be prejudiced in having to defend on the merits .
b. Timeliness of Notice .
On first reading, the provisions of sub-rules (b) and (c) as
to the time within which the defendant or the party to be added as
defendant must receive notice may appear extremely radical, since
they provide in effect that notice is timely though received only
within twelve months after the expiry of the limitation period .
However, it is believed that this provision is both consistent with
the policy and operation of limitation periods and necessary to do
justice in all cases .
The United States Federal Rule 15(c) provides that the
defendant must have received notice within the limitation period .
165 See, Wright and Miller, op . cit., footnote 10, §1500.
166Ibid ., §1499.
167 See the cases cited supra, footnote 80 . But note that even in this type
of case (where up until the time of attempted joinder the new defendant
has been a stranger to the litigation) the proposed rule may assist a
plaintiff because of the extended time period for notice : see discussion,
footnote 187, infra.
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But one United States court,ls8 supported by law review writing,lss
has pointed out that this formula is too restrictive . While it is the
issue of the writ that stops the running of the limitation period,
since the rules of court provide that a writ may be served at any
time within twelve months of its date of issue, 17° even in the
normal non-amendment context the law merely guarantees that the
defendant will receive notice within the limitation period plus the
time permitted for service (that is ; twelve months) . Thus the speci-
fication in sub-rules (b) and (c) as to when notice will be timely
merely adopts the standard already existing under the general law
relating to the- operation of limitation periods .,
An example will illustrate both the need for the extended time
period and the operation of the proposed rule.',,' Assume that an
automobile accident occurs on April 1st, 1973, and that P com
mences an action against D, for personal injuries suffered in the
accident, on March 1st, 1974 (within the twelve month limitation
period applicable to such actions) . In June 1974 he attempts to
serve the writ on D. At this time he discovers that D died in Octo-
ber 1973 . He now wishes to substitute D's administrator as the
party defendant. If prior to March 31st, 1974, D's administrator
had received no notice of the action then, under the time formula
embodied in the United States Federal Rules no amendment would
be allowed.172 Yet,' had the action been brought against the
administrator initially, it would have been perfectly good (provided
the writ had been issued within the limitation period) even though
he had never received any notice of the action until June, 1974,
when the writ was served upon him, well outside the limitation
period . (Indeed, the action would be quite validly constituted if
service tool- place at any time up until March, 1975.)
Proposed sub-rules (b) and (c) bake this factor into account
by specifying that .notice is timelyl7 3 ,provided it is received by the
lssMartz v . Miller Bros . Co. (1965), 244 Fed . Supp . 246, at p . 254, n.21
(D.C . Del.) . -
1 69 Note, op . cit., footnote 90, at pp . 100-106, 131-132 .
17a See, e.g ., Ont . Rules of Practice, r . 8 (1) .
171 The example given approximates, in its essentials, with what took
place in Gonzalas v . Reid, supra, footnote 93 . The problem under discussion
can, of course, arise in any type of case.
172As was held, for example, in Janus v . J.M . Barbe Co . (1972), 57
Fed . Rules Dec . 539 (D .C. Ohio) ; Simmons v . Fenton (1973), 480 F.2d
133 (7th Cir.). : Munetz v. Eaton Yale (1973), 57 Fed . Rules Dec . 476
(D.C.E.D . Pa) .
173 Assuming, as will always be so in cases to which the proposed
rule is applicable, that a writ has been issued within the limitation period.
It is to be kept in mind that the proposed rules are only available to
plaintiffs who have demonstrated their diligence by the timely issuing of
a writ .
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defendant, or the person to be added as defendant, within the
extended period in which he might have become aware of a valid
and timely commenced action against him, that is, within the
limitation period plus twelve months .
c. Meaning of "Prejudice" .
It must be stressed that the mere fact that if the amendment
is granted the defendant will lose his technical defence of the
statute of limitations, does not amount to "prejudice in maintaining
his defence on the merits" as that phrase is used in sub-rules (b)
and (c) . It is the very purpose of these rules to preclude the
defendant from objecting to an amendment simply on this ground
alone, and to prevent the setting up of such a defence to the action
as amended.17}
But, while the mere loss of the limitation defence is not
encompassed within the term prejudice in the proposed rule, the
interests of the defendant which the limitation period seeks to
protect-particularly the fair opportunity to gather evidence to
meet the claim-are the central factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether prejudice will result from an amendment changing
the parties to the action .
What constitutes prejudice in maintaining a defence on the
merits will vary from case to case and will depend upon the factual
situation before the court. Despite this, two general observations
can be made. First, in each case the court must satisfy itself, as the
rule indicates, that the defendantl75 "has received such notice that
he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defence on the merits".
Usually this will reduce itself to a question of whether the notice
received by the defendant was such as to alert him to collect and
prepare his evidence . Moreover prejudice, or the possibility of
174 This is obviously the purpose, indeed the whole purpose, of the
proposed rule . The U.S . Federal Rule, see Appendix, item 1, makes this
obviously clear (in the context of the analagous U.S . rule) by stating that
the amendment "relates back to the date of the original pleading" (i.e .
writ) . In drafting the proposed rule, I did not use this language, merely
in deference to the fact that it is not (as it is in the U.S. and has been for
years) in common usage in Canada . I believe the U.S . terminology is, in
fact, clearer and the proposed rule would be improved by its inclusion.
175 Either the new or original defendant, as the case may be . The ensuing
discussion is primarily directed to cases involving the addition of a new
defendant under sub-rule (c). In such cases the possibility of prejudice to
the proposed new defendant may be a very real one. By contrast amend-
ments changing or adding a plaintiff, or changing his capacity under
sub-rule (b) are, as a general matter, much less likely to involve a risk
of prejudice to the defendant, due largely to requirement (iii) of sub-
rule (b), coupled with the fact that the original plaintiff's writ or pleading
will usually have informed the defendant of any claim to be asserted by
'the new plaintiff.
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prejudice, will. normally be a function of the type of notice received
by. the defendant: the more informal and less specific the notice
the greater the likelihood of prejudice to the defendant in having
to defend on the merits .176
Second, in dealing with the question of prejudice it is
important that courts avoid stating-bare conclusions without care-
ful factual investigation (as has been the approach of many United
States courts),177 The requirement is one that necessitates, in fair-
ness to both plaintiffs and defendants, close factual analysis . But
this does not mean that courts cannot make use of reasonable
evidential presumptions . Generally, where a defendant has received
notice of the claim, it will be reasonable to call on him to establish
prejudice.17 s
(iii) Requirement that, the Addition of a New Plaintiff Must be
Necessary to the Effective Enforcement of the Claims
Originally Asserted.
With regard to amendments adding a plaintiff, sub-rule (b)
imposes a further requirement.179 In such cases it must be shown,
even where the defendant has had such notice that he will not be
176 Note, op . cit., footnote 90, at p . 117 . For a discussion of the whole
question of what, may or may not amount to prejudice see also Wright and
Miller, op. cit., footnote 10, p . 510 et seq.
177 Note, ibid., at p,. 115 .
178 See the discussion supra, text, at footnote 126.
179 United States Federal Rule 15(c) imposes yet a further requirement
as a pre-condition to the adding of a new defendant . Under the U.S . rule,
in addition to notice and lack of prejudice, it must appear that the new
defendant "knew or should have known that, but for a mistake covering
the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought
against him" . On balance, it is felt it is unnecessary to include a similar
provision as a separate and specific requirement in the proposed model
rule . It is difficult to see how this further requirement would, in most
cases, really add anything to the notice-lack of prejudice requirement, and
in those cases where it does add anything the wisdom of so further limiting
the plaintiff's ability to add a defendant is open to question. Where a
new defendant can show that he lacked the knowledge required under
Federal Rule 15(c) (i.e . that, but for the plaintiff's mistake, he would have
been sued initially) then such lack of knowledge may well indicate that the
defendant would be prejudiced in having to defend. If so, then under the
proposed model rule he will not be added because of the prejudice that
would result . But where, despite his lack of knowledge, the defendant would
suffer no prejudice in having to defend it is difficult to see why he should
not be joined . It is interesting to note that in the U.S., the courts have paid
little attention to the "knowledge" requirement of Rule 15(c) . See Note,
op . cit ., footnote 90, at p . 117 . But, contrary to the position here taken, the
Note argues that , the "knowledge" requirement of Federal Rule 15(c) is
necessary to fully uphold the policy of the statute of limitations in pro-
tecting defendants from stale claims : Jbid ., at pp. 117-120, 127-133 .
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prejudiced in defending on the merits, that the addition of the
new plaintiff is necessary or desirable to ensure the effective en-
forcement of the claims originally asserted in the action . This
provision is designed to prevent a would-be plaintiff, who has
not been diligent and is out of time, using the amendment rule to
take advantage of the fact that another plaintiff has diligently
commenced an action in respect of an occurrence which the new,
would-be plaintiff, was also involved in. A simple example will
illustrate the point. Assume driver A was injured in a collision
and timely commences an action against D. Subsequently, after the
expiry of the limitation period B, A's co-passenger, who suffered
injuries in the accident but who has never informed D that he had
or was making a claim, seeks to be added as a plaintiff in order
to recover damages for his own injuries . Absent the third require-
ment of sub-rule (b), the rule might be taken to authorize the addi-
tion of B in such a case . Since the purpose of the rule is only to
aid diligent plaintiffs in perfecting actions they have timely com-
menced, a request by someone in B's position to be added should
be excluded from the operation of the rule. B is simply a non-
diligent plaintiff who has failed to commence an action within the
limitation period, and the addition of his claim is unnecessary to
insure the effective enforcement of A's original claims .l$o
In conclusion, several further matters should be briefly
mentioned. First, the proposed model rules should ideally form
part of the rules of practice rather than of some statute such as
the Judicature Act or the Limitations Act. It is simply more logical
and convenient if this can be done : the general provisions dealing
with the court's power to amend proceedings are found in the rules
iso But this third requirement will be satisfied in those situations, already
encountered in the case law, where justice requires amendment, e.g., the
married woman-special damage cases, infant-special damage cases and
those involving "nullities", assignment, misnomer and mistaken choice of
plaintiff, since in all such cases all the amendment will seek to do is to
"ensure the effective enforcement of the claim originally . . . asserted" in
the action .
However, because of this third requirement of sub-rule (c) the result
in the Ont. Hosp . Services Comm . cases, supra, footnote 77, would be
different after the adoption of the model rule, unless the outcome of those
cases flows from the special statutory and regulatory provisions applicable
to them, (on this point see the discussion in Ont. Hosp . Services Conim. v.
Barsoski, supra, footnote 77, at p. 728) . These cases are, in reality, cases in
which the injured person has not been diligent and has simply failed to
commence his action within the limitation period . Under the proposed
rule an amendment adding the injured person as a party to Ontario
Hospital Services Commission's action would be refused because it could
not be said that the addition of such a party "is necessary or desirable to
ensure the effective enforcement of the claims originally asserted or intended
to be asserted in the action".
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and the proposed model rules are an integral part of that power.
Questions may arise, however, as to whether. the relevant rules
committees have under (their present enabling statutes the power
to enact rules which deal so intimately with statutory limitation
periods.181 The English-82 rule on the subject and the United States
Federal Rule 15(C)183 have withstood challenges that they are
ultra vires and it is believed that the model rule here proposed
can be similarly supported. However, if any serious doubts exist
as to the present power of rules committees to enact the, proposed
rule, enabling legislation should be sought expressly granting them
the necessary power.
Second, in enacting the proposed model rule a provision
should be, added making it clear that the term "plaintiff" in-
cludes the plaintiff in third-party proceedings and a plaintiff by
counterclaim, and that the term "defendant" includes a defendant
in third-party proceedings and a defendant by counterclaim .
Finally, there is .one type of situation that is not completely
and adequately -dealt with by the proposed model rule and which
calls for a separate legislative solution. It is the situation where a
plaintiff sues the person he believes to be the owner of a motor
vehicle which has occasioned damage to him, relying on the fact
that the named defendant was registered as the owner of the
vehicle. It subsequently turns out, however, that someone other
than -the registered .owner who is named as :defendant is the Actual
owner of the wéhicle.18"'Where the actual owner in . fact receives
timely notice of the plaintiff's claimhe can be added as a defendant
under the model rule . But where he has not received timely notice
the rule will be of no assistance to the plaintiff. This result seems
quite unjust . Even when he has not received timely notice -there
seems no .good reason why the actual owner of the vehicle should
in these circumstances be permitted to escape liability by relying
on the limitation period . The only reason he was not, originally
named as defendant was his failure to register as owner as required
by the legislation . What is called for here is special legislation,
181 Doubts of this kind may have led to the enactment of the Saskatch-
ewan and Alberta provisions (see Appendix) in the form of legislation
rather than as Rules of Practice .
182 See, Rodriguez v . Parker, [1967] 1 Q.B . 116 and Mitchell v . Harris
Engineering Co . Ltd ., [1967] 2 Q.B . 703 (C.A .) .
183 See, Wright and Miller, op. cit ., footnote 10, p. 534 ; Holmes v . Penna
New York Cent. Transp . Co . (1969), 48 Fed. Rules Dec. 449 (D.C.
Ind.) ; Meredith v. United Air Lines (1966), 41 Fed . . Rules Dec . 34
(D.C . Calif.) .
184 See, Lere v. Hartford Acc . : & Ind. Co ., supra, footnote 80 and also
Williams v . Davis, supra, footnote 80.
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similar to that in Alberta, 185 providing that in such circumstances
a plaintiff may add the actual owner' 11 & notwithstanding both the
expiry of the limitation period and the lack of any timely notice to
the actual owner. 187
185 See, Appendix, item 3, s.61(1) a.
186 To meet the problem presented in the Lere case, supra, footnote 80,
it may be necessary to go further and allow the plaintiff to sue the actual
owner, in a new action, out of time .
187 Note, however, that the proposed model rule greatly increases the
plaintiff's prospects of adding the actual owner even without the inter-
vention of special legislation . Since under the model rule notice is timely
if received within the limitation period plus 12 months, if the plaintiff
discovers within that time span that someone other than the registered
owner is the actual owner he can immediately notify him of the action
and apply under the model rule to substitute the actual for the registered
owner. Unless the actual owner can show prejudice in having to defend, the
court may, under the proposed rule, add him as a defendant. The extended
time period for notice under the proposed model rule may also go someway
towards dealing with another troublesome problem. It is the somewhat
anomalous situation (see the discussion footnotes 49 and 80, supra) resulting
from the operation of statutes such as the Negligence Act, supra, footnote
80, s.9, and the Highway Traffic Act, supra, footnote 37, s.146(3) which
permit a defendant to add as a third-party a person against whom a claim
by the plaintiff would be statute-barred : e.g ., P sues D for damages for
personal injury suffered in a collision ; by his statement of defence, delivered
after the limitation period, D raises the defence that the accident was
caused or contributed to by a defect in his car tires; absent the model rule,
P may not join the tire manufacturer (M) as a defendant, but under the
above legislation D may add the manufacturer as a third-party . The
situation is anomalous because though P cannot claim directly against M,
M is drawn into the litigation by being a third-party and under the rules
regarding third-party practice he is fully entitled to (and frequently will)
contest P's claim against D and D's claim against him (i.e ., M) . In so doing
M will typically rely on the very same evidence he would have used to
defend the main action had he been made a defendant thereto. P is in no
real difficulty provided D is found to be partly at fault because under the
Negligence Act, in such circumstances D is primarily liable to P for all of
the damages. However, serious consequences follow for P if D (or M)
successfully establish that M was solely responsible for P's injuries; P's
action against D will be dismissed and he will be entitled to no recovery
against M because the latter was not a defendant to P's action : Beaulieu v.
Lavoie, supra, footnote 80 . In the above type of situation the wisdom of
relieving D from the limitation period in respect of his claim against M
while still leaving P subject to the limitation period in respect of a claim by
him against M, may be questioned . The proposed model rule will probably
go a long way towards easing the situation, principally as a result of the
extended period in which notice may be timely, i.e . the limitation period
plus 12 months. Provided P serves his writ and statement of claim on D
with any sort of promptness he will receive D's statement of defence well
within the limitation period plus 12 months. If the statement of defence
reveals a potential co-defendant-third-party, the plaintiff can promptly
notify this person, within the limitation period plus 12 months, and apply
to add him as a defendant under the proposed rule . If the notice is given
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APPENDIX
Rules and statutes from various jurisdictions dealing with the amendment
of proceedings after the expiration of the limitation period .
1 . United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule I5(c).
(c) Relation Back of Amendments . Whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out, of the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the . date of the original
pleading . An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is
asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within
the period provided by law for commencing the action against him,
the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice
of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in main-
taining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known
that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against him.
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or
his designee,, or the Attorney General of the United States, or an
agency or officer who would have been a proper defendant if named,
satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with respect
to the United States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into
the action as a defendant . '
2 . United Kingdom, the Federal Court of Canada and Nova Scotia .
United Kingdom, Rules of the Supreme Court 1966, Order 20,
rule 5. Virtually identical - provisions appear in the Rules of the Federal
Court of Canada (General Orders and Rules) and in the Nova Scotia
Civil Procedure, Rules, rule 15.02 . (The numbers- of the equivalent
Federal Court ules are indicated in the margin .)
Rule 420 : 5.-(1) Subject to Order 15,_ rules 6, 7 and 8 and the fol-
lowing provisions of this rule, the Court may at any stage
of the proceedings allow the plaintiff . to amend his . writ, or
any party to amend his pleading, on such terms as to costs
or otherwise as may be just and in such manner (if any)
as it may direct .
Rule 424 : '(2) Where an application to the Court for leave to make
the amendment mentioned in .paragraph (3), (4) or (5) is
made after any relevant period of limitation current at the
date of issue of the writ has expired, the Court may never-
theless, grant such leave in the circumstances mentioned in
that paragraph if it thinks it just to do so .
Rule' 425 : (3) An amendment to correct the name of a party maybe
allowed under paragraph (2) notwithstanding that it is
alleged that the effect of the amendment will be to substitute
a new party if the Court is satisfied that the mistake sought
in this manner and the defendant cannot show that he will be prejudiced
in having to defend on the merits the court may allow the amendment . All
the above, coupled with the relatively short time period provided by the rules
for serving a third-party notice (and the attitude of the courts in enforcing
that time limit)-see Ont. Rules of Practice, r . 167(3) and the cases
collected under that rule in Holmested and Gale, op . cit ., footnote 3-will
mean that the instances in which a defendant can add a person as a third-
party where the plaintiff cannot make the person a defendant will be
greatly reduced and perhaps rare .
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to be corrected was a genuine mistake and was not mis-
leading or such as to cause any reasonable doubt as to the
identity of the person intending to sue or, as the case may be,
intended to be sued .
Rule 426: (4) An amendment to alter the capacity in which a party
sues (whether as plaintiff or as defendant by counterclaim)
may be allowed under paragraph (2) if the capacity in
which, if the amendment is made, the party will sue is one
in which at the date of issue of the writ or the making of
the counterclaim, as the case may be, he might have sued .
Rule 427: (5) An amendment may be allowed under paragraph (2)
notwithstanding that the effect of the amendment will be to
add or substitute a new cause of action if the new cause of
action arises out of the same fact . Or substantially the same
facts as a cause of action in respect of which relief has
already been claimed in the action by the party applying for
leave to make the amendment.
3. Alberta: The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A ., 1970, c.209 .
S.61. (1) Where an action to which this Part applies has been
commenced within the time allowed by or under this Part,
the court, upon application, may authorize an amendment
to any pleading or proceeding therein that will result in a
change of parties to the action :
(a) where the action is one against the registered owner
of a motor vehicle alleged to have occasioned the
damages sustained and thereafter the plaintiff learns
that the registered owner was not the actual owner of
the vehicle at the time the damages were sustained, if
the court is satisfied that there was sufficient and rea-
sonable excuse for the failure of the plaintiff to learn of
the existence of the actual owner and if the change is
is only the substitution of the actual owner;
(b) where the action is one on behalf of a person under
disability or the estate of a deceased person and the
action was brought by or in the name of a person not
entitled under law to bring an action on behalf of the
person under disability or the estate of the deceased
person, if the court is satisfied that no affected person
has been misled as to the true nature of the action and
if the change is only the substitution of the proper
persons to bring the action ;
(c) where the action is one brought against a person who
was in fact deceased at the time the action was com-
menced against him, if the court is satisfied that the
action is one which under The Administration of Estates
Act could, at the time, have been maintained against the
estate of a deceased person and if the change is only
the substitution of the estate of the deceased person ;
notwithstanding that the time limited by this Part for com-
mencing that class of action had lapsed between the time the
action was commenced and the time of the application for the
amendment.
(2) An amendment authorized under subsection (1) may
only be made within three months after the authorization is
granted.
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4 . Saskatchewan : The Queen's Bench Act, R.S .S ., 1965, c.73 .
S .44 (11) : Where an action is brought to enforce any right, legal or
equitable, the court may permit the amendment of any
pleading or other proceeding therein upon such terms as to
costs or otherwise as it deems just notwithstanding that,
between the time of the issue of the writ and the application
for amendment,'the right of action would, but by reason of
action brought, have been barred by the provisions of any
statute ; provided that such amendment does not involve a
change of parties other than a change caused by the death
of one of the parties .
5 . Ontario : Recommendation of the . Ontario Law Reform .Commission.
In 1969 the Ontario Law Reform Commission in its Report on
Limitation of Action, p. 115 recommended that :
In any action, the court should be able to allow the amend-
ment of any pleading or other proceedings, or an application
for a, change of party, .upon such terms as to costs or other-
wise as the court deems just, notwithstanding that, between
time of the issue of the writ ' and the application for
amendment ~or change of party, a fresh cause of action
disclosed by the amendment or the cause of action against
the new party would have been barred by a limitation
provision .
No steps have as yet been taken to implement this recommendation.
